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This March-June edition is a bumper two editions in
one with four interesting and valuable papers.  The
program got off track at the end of last year and in
spite of a continuing series of difficulties things are
beginning to stabilize.  All being well, and having
papers to hand, the normal pattern should be resumed
by September.  The end and beginning of each year
always have been the most difficult to accommodate.
December-January are busy times for many people …
some of whom have been involved with a November
Annual Conference and need to get back to their
regular work.  Others are winding up the year’s
activities and looking forward to holiday time.  This
year, a very early Easter put another spanner in the
works! Until we have a steady backlog of papers it 
is hard to determine content in advance and time flies
while gathering material and arranging for referee and
editing processes.  Many factors impinge on creating 
a reliable routine while a publication is getting firmly
established.  As stated many times previously, there 
is a need for an active all-states editorial committee 
to share the responsibility of promoting contributions
and monitoring their progress.  As demonstrated by 
the contributions from other countries over the years,
Ergonomics Australia has the potential to become 
a significant voice promoting ergonomics in the
southern hemisphere.    
There are papers from authors in Australia, India 
and France in this edition.  Recent media attention 
has focussed on the need to encourage more active
lifestyles … to both improve the national health profile
and to limit the use of private vehicles and their
consumption of finite oil reserves.  While industry
concentrates on developing alternative power sources
to service the needs of a rapidly increasing world
population, individuals are being encouraged to 
walk more and to ride a bicycle to work and/or 
for recreation.  One of the biggest problems in 
this scenario is the lack of suitably safe traffic
infrastructure in most metropolitan areas.  The article
about pedal cyclist traffic casualties in South Australia
by Hutchinson, Kloeden, and Long is thus an important
contribution to the general debate about future
community infrastructure needs.  It is another call 
to arms for ergonomists to be involved professionally
in the wider aspects of planning debates. 
The issues surrounding design and operational factors
in Intensive Care Units at large and medium sized
hospitals in India reflect problems that may be
observed in developed as well as developing countries.
In many instances there is a common thread of design
as a stand-alone package that is simply delivered to 
the users without their prior input. Some ICU health
professionals, in discussions with the editor, have 
also highlighted the systems failures in preparing 
staff rosters that ignore the need for experienced
support staff rather than matching a new graduate 
with a single senior nurse on evening shifts and 
then requiring the senior to attend the emergency
department to take responsibility for a critical case
admission.  This is a major concern for staff whose
voice seems to be set aside in favour of budget
restraints in discussions of risk management procedures
in an acute hospital setting. Again, this is another 
facet of human factors that deserves to be addressed 
by ergonomists.
The second paper by another Indian ergonomist
demonstrates the extremely hazardous task of 
manual brick manufacture.  It highlights the lack of
consideration of human factors which causes so many
of the injuries experienced by the workers in this
activity.  While access to mechanization in developed
countries may have reduced some of the hazards
identified in this paper, some of the human factors
information that is provided could well be noted for
awareness in other forms of physical work activities.
The nature of risk assessment and control involves
fundamental tenets which need to be addressed,
regardless of specific variations expected in any
complex scenario.  The complexity of risk management
is the one constant factor across all workplaces.
The final article in this issue of EA has kindly been
provided by Erik Hollnagel, who prepared it for use 
at the recent HFESA Workshop he presented in
Brisbane, Queensland.  It provides both a theoretical
and a practical approach to risk management which
neatly supports the earlier papers in this edition. By 
all accounts his workshop was greatly appreciated 
by those in attendance and Robin Burgess-Limerick
suggested that other ergonomists would value access to
Erik’s paper. Both author and editor were very pleased
to activate this suggestion. 
Anyone following the trend of papers submitted to 
EA since it became a refereed journal in 2002 would
realise that, increasingly, the authors are becoming
more concerned with a philosophy of ergonomics
rather than the mere analysis of specific physical
conditions relating to human interaction with products
and environments.  This shift to a systems approach 
is leading HF/E practitioners into new areas of
transdisciplinary involvement which can only benefit
all parties.  This concept is reflected in the theme of
the 44th HFESA Conference to be held in Adelaide,
South Australia 17-19 November 2008:  Sustainable
Performance - The Human Factor, Ergonomics and 
the Work Environment. This is a very topical title as
sustainability is the current buzzword in just about
every type of human work and academic endeavour.  
Editorial
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It is a new way of requiring and describing ‘intelligent
buildings’, ‘effective programming’ and ‘green
outcomes’ for life-cycle rather than first-cost
considerations in any design project.  Members 
of the HFESA need to be pro-active in this scene. 
Shann Gibbs PhD
Editor 
From the Internet
You gotta love the Canadian sense of humour.
West Jet is an Airline with head office situated in
Calgary, Alberta and airline attendants make an 
effort to make the in-flight "safety lecture" and
announcements a bit more entertaining.
Here are some real examples that have been heard 
or reported:
On a West Jet flight (There is no assigned seating, you
just sit where you want) passengers were apparently
having a hard time choosing, when a flight attendant
announced, People, people we're not picking out
furniture here, find a seat and get in it!"
On another West Jet Flight with a very "senior" flight
attendant crew, the pilot said, "Ladies and gentlemen,
we've reached cruising altitude and will be turning
down the cabin lights. This is for your comfort and 
to enhance the appearance of your flight attendants."
On landing, the stewardess said, "Please be sure to 
take all of your belongings. If you're going to leave
anything, please make sure it's something we'd like 
to have."
“There may be 50 ways to leave your lover, but there
are only 4 ways out of this airplane."
“Thank you for flying West Jet Express.  We hope you
enjoyed giving us the business as much as we enjoyed
taking you for a ride."
As the plane landed and was coming to a stop at 
the Vancouver Airport, a lone voice came over the
loudspeaker: "Whoa, big fella. WHOA!"
After a particularly rough landing during
thunderstorms in Ontario, a flight attendant on a West
Jet flight announced, "Please take care when opening
the overhead compartments because, after a landing
like that, sure as hell everything has shifted."
From a West Jet Airlines employee: "Welcome aboard
West Jet Flight 245 to Calgary. To operate your seat
belt, insert the metal tab into the buckle, and pull tight.
It works just like every other seat belt; and, if you
don't know how to operate one, you probably
shouldn't be out in public unsupervised."
"In the event of a sudden loss of cabin pressure, masks
will descend from the ceiling. Stop screaming, grab the
mask, and pull it over your face. If you have a small
child traveling with you, secure your mask before
assisting with theirs. If you are traveling with more
than one small child, pick your favourite."
"Weather at our destination is 50 degrees with some
broken clouds, but we'll try to have them fixed before
we arrive. Thank you, and remember, nobody loves
you, or your money, more than West Jet Airlines."
"Your seat cushions can be used for flotation; and 
in the event of an emergency water landing, please
paddle to shore and take them with our compliments."
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An airline pilot wrote that on this particular flight he
had hammered his ship into the runway really hard.
The airline had a policy which required the first officer
to stand at the door while the Passengers exited, smile,
and give them a "Thanks for flying our airline." He
said that, in light of his bad landing, he had a hard
time looking the passengers in the eye, thinking that
someone would have a smart comment. Finally
everyone had gotten off except for a little old lady
walking with a cane. She said, "Sir, do you mind if 
I ask you a question?"
"Why, no, Ma'am," said the pilot. "What is it?"
The little old lady said, "Did we land, or were we 
shot down?"
After a real crusher of a landing in Halifax, the
attendant came on with, Ladies and Gentlemen, please
remain in your seats until Captain Crash and the Crew
have brought the aircraft to a screeching halt against
the gate. And, once the tire smoke has cleared and the
warning bells are silenced, we will open the door and
you can pick your way through the wreckage to the
terminal."
Part of a flight attendant's arrival announcement:
"We'd like to thank you folks for flying with us today.
And, the next time you get the insane urge to go
blasting through the skies in a pressurized metal tube,
we hope you'll think of West Jet airways.
Heard on a West Jet Airline flight. "Ladies and
gentlemen, if you wish to smoke, the smoking section
on this airplane is on the wing. If you can light 'em,
you can smoke 'em."
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“As you exit the plane, make sure to gather all of your
belongings. Anything left behind will be distributed
evenly among the flight attendants. Please do not 
leave children or spouses."
And from the pilot during his welcome message: 
"West Jet Airlines is pleased to announce that we 
have some of the best flight attendants in the industry.
Unfortunately, none of them are on this flight!"
Heard on West Jet Airlines just after a very hard
landing in Edmonton. 
The flight attendant came on the intercom and said,
"That was quite a bump, and I know what y'all are
thinking. I'm here to tell you it wasn't the airline's
fault, it wasn't the pilot's fault, it wasn't the flight
attendant's fault, it was the asphalt."
Overheard on a West Jet Airlines flight into Regina, 
on a particularly windy and bumpy day.
During the final approach, the Captain was really
having to fight it. After an extremely hard landing, the
Flight Attendant said, "Ladies and Gentlemen, welcome
to Regina. Please remain in your seats with your seat
belts fastened while the Captain taxis what's left of 
our airplane to the gate!"
Another flight attendant's comment on a less than
perfect landing: "We ask you to please remain seated
as Captain Kangaroo bounces us to the terminal."
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A plane was taking off from the Winnipeg Airport.
After it reached a comfortable cruising altitude, the
captain made an announcement over the intercom,
"Ladies and gentlemen, this is your captain speaking.
Welcome to Flight Number 293, non-stop from
Winnipeg to Montreal. The weather ahead is good and,
therefore, we should have a smooth and uneventful
flight. Now sit back and relax... OH, MY GOD!"  
Silence followed, and after a few minutes, the captain
came back on the intercom and said, "Ladies and
Gentlemen, I am so sorry if I scared you earlier. While 
I was talking to you, the flight attendant accidentally
spilled a cup of hot coffee in my lap. You should see
the front of my pants!  A passenger in Coach yelled,
"That's nothing. You should see the back of mine!"
Shann Gibbs 
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A r t i c l e s
1. Overview of pedal cyclist traffic casualties in South Australia
T. P. Hutchinson, C. N. Kloeden, and A. D. Long
Centre for Automotive Safety Research, the University of Adelaide, South Australia 5005
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Characteristics of pedal cycle crashes (as reported 
to the police) in South Australia, and how they have
changed over the period 1981-2004, are examined. The
paper describes both the present situation (2001-2004)
and how it has changed since 1981; both child and
adult casualties; both the numbers of casualties and 
the proportions seriously injured; and both factors that
are commonly tabulated and some that are relatively
unusual. In 1981, pedal cyclist casualties were mostly
children and teenagers, but in 2004, pedal cyclist
casualties were mostly spread across the age range
from 16 to 49. Child pedal cyclist casualties reached a
maximum in 1982-1987, and have fallen sharply since.
Adult pedal cyclist casualties reached a maximum in
1987-1990, and then fell. Concerning the proportion 
of casualties seriously injured (i.e., killed or admitted 
to hospital), in 2001-2004 this proportion among adults
(16+) was 12% when the speed limit was 60 km/h or
less, and 33% when the speed limit was 70 km/h or
higher. Among the four most frequent types of crashes
(right angle, side swipe, right turn, and rear end), the
proportions of adult casualties seriously injured were
11%, 11%, 16%, and 18%. The proportion was 14% 
for male drivers of the motor vehicle and 9% for
female drivers; it was 17%, 15%, 15%, 14%, 10%, 
and 11% for motor vehicle driver age groups 16-19,
20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-99.
Introduction
Many governments at present give a degree of
encouragement to cycling, for reasons of health and
environmental sustainability. In South Australia, the
relevant document is Safety in Numbers. A Cycling
Strategy for South Australia 2006-2010 (DTEI, 2006).
The opening sentence makes safety central: “Market
research shows that many people choose not to cycle
because they perceive cycling to be unsafe --- so the
challenge lies in improving not only safety for the
existing cyclists but the perception of safety for those
not currently cycling”. Indeed, a casual observer easily
sees that much of the transport system does not fit 
the needs of the cyclist very well, the roads being too 
fast, the footpaths too slow, and many junctions a
nightmare. The sides of many heavy goods vehicles 
are not enclosed, and the danger of cyclists (and
pedestrians and motorcyclists) going under the rear
wheels is ever-present. As to occupational safety, the
bicycle is chiefly of interest as a means of getting 
to and from work, but it is also for some people a
workplace: Dennerlein and Meeker (2002) studied
accidents to bicycle couriers (using a self-administered
survey form, rather than data routinely collected by
police or hospitals). 
Adelaide is mostly flat and the weather is largely 
dry, and cycling is feasible even without some great
commitment of principle. Public transport (mostly
buses) is reasonably good. The private car, nevertheless,
is the dominant mode of travel. According to
household travel surveys, the numbers of person trips
per day in Adelaide (population 1.1 million) were 
3.4 million in 1986 and also 3.4 million in 1999, the
numbers as car driver being 1.8 and 2.0 million, and
the numbers by bicycle being 0.089 and 0.040 million
(Transport SA, 2002).
The present paper examines certain characteristics of
pedal cycle crashes in South Australia, and how they
have changed over the period 1981-2004. It is based
upon a rather fuller account in Hutchinson et al.
(2006). The organization of this paper is as follows.
Section 2 describes the data, and Section 3 identifies
the trends over the period 1981-2004. Sections 4-10
presents data for pedal cyclist casualties for the period
2001-2004, the Sections respectively referring to time
of crash, place (postcode), the site and events, the pedal
cyclist, the motor vehicle and its driver, fatalities, 
and the proportion of casualties seriously injured. The
period 2001-2004 was chosen so as to be long enough
to include sufficient accidents to give a good picture,
yet not to extend too far into the past.
Data
The source of data is the Traffic Accident Reporting
System (TARS) database, which originates from police
reports. Statistics on child and adult pedal cyclist
casualties will be given separately. To do this, it is
necessary to exclude casualties of unknown age from
the tabulations. In 2001-2004, these accounted for
some 11.8 per cent of the total, and for casualties who
were killed or admitted to hospital, the proportion was
7.5 per cent. Postcode groups 5000-5099, 5100-5199,
and 5200-5999 will be used in some Tables below. The
first two of these groups together refer to metropolitan
Adelaide: the first to an area with a boundary that is
between 8 and 16 km from the centre of Adelaide, and
the second to outer Metropolitan Adelaide. Postcodes
5200-5999 refer to the rest of South Australia. For
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brevity, the term serious casualties will be used for
those killed or admitted to hospital, adult casualties
will mean those aged 16 and over, and child casualties
will mean those aged 5-15.
Datasets based on police reports of crashes are always
incomplete: they tend to under-represent crashes in
which injury is minor, and those in which property
damage is minor. Pedal cycle crashes are probably
underrepresented to a greater degree than others. For
pedal cycle crashes not involving a motor vehicle, it
would undoubtedly be necessary to find another data
source, such as the hospital system or self report. Police
reports do not have information about nature of injury.
In principle, this is available in hospital records
(especially for in-patients), but these have not been
utilised in the present paper. 
Trends
Substantial changes in pedal cycle crashes have
occurred between 1981 and 2004. In 1981, pedal cyclist
casualties were mostly children and teenagers. In 2004,
pedal cyclist casualties were mostly spread across the
age range from 16 to 49. Adult pedal cyclist casualties
reached a maximum in 1987-1990, and then fell, and
child pedal cyclist casualties reached a maximum in
1982-1987, and have fallen sharply since. See Figure 1.
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Years Age group (years)
5-7 8-12 13-15 16-19 20-59 60+
1981-1984 4.6 19.4 20.5 13.7 36.6 4.9
1985-1988 2.9 13.7 19.6 17.2 41.1 5.1
1989-1992 2.0 10.8 16.1 18.9 48.3 3.7
1993-1996 1.5 11.5 13.5 13.2 55.1 5.0
1997-2000 1.5 11.1 10.4 11.1 60.9 4.9
2001-2004 1.1 7.4 7.0 8.2 70.8 5.3
Table 1. Age distribution (percentages) of pedal cycle casualties, South Australia,
for each of six four-year periods, 1981-2004. (Those of unknown age were excluded.)
Figure 1. Pedal cycle casualties in South Australia 1981-2004.
The wearing of helmets by pedal cyclists became
compulsory on 1st July 1991. This probably deterred
some people from cycling and in addition prevented
some being injured (Marshall and White, 1994).
Percentages in the different age groups in different
periods are given in Table 1. Those aged 0-15, as a
proportion of total pedal cyclist casualties, have fallen
from 45 per cent in 1981-1984 to 16 per cent in 2001-
2004. Those aged 30-59 increased from 17 per cent 
to 48 per cent.
Figure 2 shows the percentage that were killed or
admitted to hospital. In the case of adults, there has
been a fall from 31 per cent in 1981 to 14 per cent in
2004. (Those killed, as a proportion of total pedal
cyclist casualties aged 16 and over, also fell, from 1.4
per cent in 1981-1984 to 1.0 per cent in 2001-2004.) In
the case of children, there has been a fall from 34 per
cent in 1981 to 22 per cent in 2004. (Those killed, as 
a proportion of total pedal cyclist casualties aged 5-15,
also fell, from 2.1 per cent in 1981-1984 to 1.2 per
cent in 2001-2004.) 
From 1 March 2003, the speed limit on most urban
roads changed from 60 km/h to 50 km/h; it remained
60 km/h or higher on urban arterials. Did this reduce
the number of pedal cyclist casualties? The data are
suggestive of a reduction in the case of adult pedal
cyclist casualties: there is no decline in the years up 
to 2002, but then the numbers in 2003 and 2004 are
slightly lower. See Kloeden, Woolley, and McLean
(2004) for the effect on road casualties (not specifically
pedal cyclists) of the speed limit reduction. Child pedal
cyclist casualties are too few for a detectable effect to
be expected, and, indeed, the numbers in 2003-2004
were not lower than in 2001-2002.
Time of crash
Adult casualties are slightly fewer in midsummer and
midwinter than at other times of the year. There tend
to be fewer casualties per day on weekends than on
weekdays. The times of day when casualties are most
frequent are those when most people are travelling to
or from work: the hours beginning 07, 08, 09, 16, 17,
and 18. 
For children, there are about the same number of
casualties per day on weekends as on weekdays. The
times of day when casualties are most frequent are
those when most children are travelling to or from
school: the hours beginning 08, 15, 16, 17. (As might
be expected, the hourly pattern is different at weekends
and in school holidays.) 
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Figure 2. Pedal cycle casualties in South Australia, 1981-2004:
percentage in which the rider was killed or admitted to hospital.
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Place (postcode)
For adults, postcode groups 5000-5099, 5100-5199, and
5200-5999 account for respectively 80 per cent, 13 per
cent, and 7 per cent of casualties. Most casualties live
in a different postcode from that of the crash. 
For children, most casualties live in the same postcode
as that of the crash --- to a lesser extent for those aged
13-15 than for younger children. 
Site and events
For adults, the majority of casualties occur at junctions
(Table 2). About 93 per cent of casualties occur on
roads where the speed limit is 60 km/h or lower; in
2004 (i.e., after 50 km/h became the speed limit on
most urban roads), fewer occurred on 50 km/h than 
on 60 km/h roads. The categories in Table 3 were
chosen in an attempt to give a reasonable picture of
the type of site (the speed limit, whether there was a
junction or not, what type of road or type of junction,
and the traffic control) yet keeping the list limited in
length. Crashes termed “right angle” were the most
common (Table 4).
For children, about the same numbers occurred at
junctions and not at junctions (Table 2). About 94 per
cent of casualties occur on roads where the speed limit
is 60 km/h or lower, and in 2004, more occurred on 50
km/h than on 60 km/h roads. Crashes termed “right
angle” were the most common (Table 5).
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Road geometry Cyclist age group (years)
5-15 16+
Junction 121 808
Not at junction 116 521
Unknown 12 25
Total 249 1354
Table 2. Numbers of pedal cycle casualties in South
Australia 2001-2004: comparison of adults and children
in respect of road geometry.
Table 3. Numbers of pedal cycle casualties aged 
16 and over in South Australia 2001-2004, by 
postcode group of crash and the nature of the site.
Speed limit (km/h), whether at Postcode group Total
junction, and details 5000-5099 5100-5199 5200-5999
0-60, no junction, 256 21 3 280
divided road
0-60, no junction, 129 28 25 182 
not divided road
0-60, junction, traffic signals, 46 46
T- or Y-junction
0-60, junction, traffic signals, 135 6 2 143
crossroads
0-60, junction, priority, 310 45 16 371
T- or Y-junction
0-60, junction, priority, 99 7 18 124
crossroads
0-60, junction, roundabout 65 20 6 91
70+, no junction 14 23 18 55
70+, junction 10 15 6 31
Other and unknown 24 7 31
Total 1088 172 94 1354
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Crash type Postcode group Total
5000-5099 5100-5199 5200-5999
Rear end 82 23 11 116
Hit fixed object 33 8 2 43
Side swipe 217 30 21 268
Right angle 394 74 33 501
Head on 16 8 1 25
Hit pedestrian 5 5
Roll over 46 9 8 63
Right turn 150 5 3 158
Hit parked vehicle 54 5 8 67
Hit animal 5 2 1 8
Hit object on road 7 1 8
Left road out of control 7 1 2 10
Other 72 6 4 82
Total 1088 172 94 1354
Crash type Age group (years) Total
5-7 8-12 13-15
Rear end 5 7 12
Hit fixed object 1 3 4
Side swipe 5 12 12 29
Right angle 13 87 74 174
Head on 8 3 11
Roll over 1 1 2
Right turn 2 7 9
Hit parked vehicle 1 3 4
Hit object on road 1 1
Other 2 1 3
Total 18 119 112 249
Table 4. Numbers of pedal cycle casualties aged 16 and over in South Australia 2001-2004, 
by postcode group of crash and crash type.
Table 5. Number of pedal cycle casualties aged 5-15 in South Australia 2001-2004,
by crash type and age group of casualty.
12
ERGONOMICS AUSTRALIA
The pedal cyclist
Among adults, male casualties outnumber females
about 4 to 1. 
Among children, male casualties outnumber females
about 6 to 1. 
For the age distribution, see Table 1. (The age groups
for children were chosen so as to be the same as in
Road Crashes in South Australia 2002.)
The motor vehicle and its driver
For this Section, the crashes have been restricted to
those in which there was a single motor vehicle and 
a single pedal cycle. The numbers of casualties are
consequently slightly fewer in Tables 6 to 8 than in
other Tables. 
For adult cyclist casualties, male and female drivers
were in the approximate proportions 62 per cent and
38 per cent (Table 6). The distribution of their ages is
shown in Table 7. Cars and car derivatives make up
about 77 per cent of the total (Table 8). For serious
casualties, the number of cases with other vehicle 
types involved was 34 per cent of the number with
cars involved, as compared with 14 per cent for all
severities of injury.
For child cyclist casualties, male and female drivers
were in the approximate proportions 56 per cent and
44 per cent (Table 6). The distribution of their ages is
shown in Table 7. Cars and car derivatives make up
about 82 per cent of the total (Table 8). For serious
casualties, the number of cases with other vehicle types
involved was 19 per cent of the number with cars
involved, as compared with 8 per cent for all severities
of injury.
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Table 6. Numbers of pedal cycle casualties in South Australia 2001-2004 in single motor vehicle vs single bicycle
crashes: comparison of adults and children in respect of sex of motor vehicle driver.
For adult pedal cycle casualties injured seriously, male and female
drivers respectively numbered 88 and 35.
For child pedal cycle casualties injured seriously, male and female
drivers respectively numbered 34 and 9.
Table 7. Numbers of pedal cycle casualties in South Australia 2001-2004 in single motor vehicle vs single bicycle
crashes: comparison of adults and children in respect of age of motor vehicle driver.
Sex of motor Cyclist age group (years)
vehicle driver
5-15 16+
Male 124 631
Female 97 387
Unknown 15 72
Total 236 1090
Age group of motor Cyclist age group (years)
vehicle driver
5-15 16+
16-19 13 64
20-29 40 168
30-39 45 168
40-49 36 203
50-59 32 137
60-69 16 37
70-99 5 44
Unknown 49 269
Total 236 1090
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Fatalities
For adults, fatalities were 1 per cent of the total
casualties, those recorded as being admitted to 
hospital were 13 per cent, those treated at hospital
were 53 per cent, and those treated but not at a
hospital were 33 per cent. 
For children, fatalities were 1 per cent of the total
casualties, those recorded as being admitted to 
hospital were 19 per cent, those treated at hospital
were 58 per cent, and those treated but not at a
hospital were 21 per cent. 
Proportion seriously injured
The proportions of adult casualties killed or admitted 
to hospital were 12 per cent, 13 per cent, and 18 per
cent in age groups 16-19, 20-59, and 60+, and were 
12 per cent, 14 per cent, and 33 per cent for crashes 
in postcode groups 5000-5099, 5100-5199, and 5200-
5999. The proportion was 12 per cent when the speed
limit was 60 km/h or less, and was 33 per cent when
the speed limit was 70 km/h or higher. As seen in Table
4, the most frequent types of crashes were those
recorded as right angle, side swipe, right turn, and rear
end; the proportions killed or admitted to hospital were
respectively 11 per cent, 11 per cent, 16 per cent, and
18 per cent. The proportions of adult casualties killed
or admitted to hospital were respectively 14 per cent
for male drivers of the motor vehicle and 9 per cent for
female drivers (see footnote to Table 6). This proportion
tended to decline with increasing age of the driver: 
17 per cent, 15 per cent, 15 per cent, 14 per cent, 
10 per cent, and 11 per cent for motor vehicle driver
age groups 16-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 
and 60-99. There was no effect of vehicle age: the
proportions of adult casualties killed or admitted to
hospital were 13 per cent when the motor vehicle 
dated from the 1980’s, 13 per cent when it dated 
from the 1990’s, and 13 per cent when it dated 
from the 2000’s.
The proportions of child casualties killed or admitted to
hospital were 44 per cent, 24 per cent, and 13 per cent
in age groups 5-7, 8-12, and 13-15; and they were 
18 per cent, 12 per cent, and 36 per cent for crashes 
in postcode groups 5000-5099, 5100-5199, and 5200-
5999. The proportion killed or admitted to hospital was
20 per cent when the speed limit was 60 km/h or less,
and was 35 per cent when the speed limit was 70 km/h
or higher; it was 27 per cent for male drivers of the
motor vehicle and 9 per cent for female drivers (see
footnote to Table 6); this percentage was much the
same for the different driver age groups, but there are
only low numbers in each age group; and it was 19 per
cent when the motor vehicle dated from the 1980’s, 
22 per cent when it dated from the 1990’s, and 20 per
cent when it dated from the 2000’s.
Discussion
What accident countermeasure for cyclists is most
worth highlighting? We think it is the same one as for
other road users: reduce speed limits and enforce them.
Speed has been known to be dangerous since long
before the motor vehicle was invented. But in the 
last ten years or so, an increasingly strong belief 
has developed that a worthwhile reduction in risk
accompanies even small reductions in speed. Case-
control studies (Kloeden et al., 1997, 2001, 2002) 
were particularly influential. We would expect both
reduction of the speed limit from 60 km/h on urban
arterials to 50 km/h, and from 50 km/h to 30 or 40
km/h on local streets, to be among the most effective
options for improving cyclist safety. Kloeden, Woolley,
and McLean (2004) analysed the effect on road
casualties, not specifically cyclists, of the reduction in
default speed limit from 60 km/h to 50 km/h that was
introduced in South Australia on 1st March 2003, and
Kloeden, McLean, and Lindsay (2004) looked ahead 
to what might happen if the limit on urban arterials 
were reduced to 50 km/h. 
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Table 8. Numbers of pedal cycle casualties in South Australia 2001-2004 in single motor vehicle vs single bicycle
crashes: comparison of adults and children in respect of type of motor vehicle.
Sex of motor Cyclist age group (years)
vehicle
5-15 16+
Car (and derivatives) 193 839 
Other 16 116
Unknown 27 135
Total 236 1090
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Conclusion
Separation of vulnerable road users from motor traffic
has been a well-known option for decades, and an
obvious possibility in the case of cyclists would be to
permit or encourage them to use the footpaths rather
than the main roads. We have given some discussion of
this in Section 5.1 of Hutchinson et al. (2006). For the
design of cycle facilities, see Austroads (1999), and for
a review of pedal cycle safety, see Meuleners et al.
(2003). Governments, whether national, state, or local,
have a degree of control over the amount of bicycling
that is done. Rietveld and Daniel (2004) compared
bicycle use in 103 Dutch municipalities using multiple
regressions. Some variables not easily subject to
control (e.g., population of the city, and how hilly it is)
had effects. But policy variables also had effects ---
both those that make cycling more attractive, and
those that make motorised modes of travel less
attractive. It seems likely that if cycle facilities in
Adelaide were improved sufficiently to generate
appreciable extra bicycle traffic, it would have to be 
by means that made cycling safer for existing cyclists.
Thus there is reason to think that doubling the number
of cycling trips (Safety in Numbers sets this goal 
for South Australia for 2015) would not result in a
doubling of cyclist casualties. Speed management, as
already noted, is a general measure that could benefit
cyclists. But for the majority of feasible measures, the
specifics of localities and the details of implementation
are very important, and not much of universal
applicability can be said briefly.
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Abstract
The manual brick manufacturing process in Gujarat
State, India is investigated. Most workers are female,
with a few male supporting staff. Issues of work related
musculoskeletal disorders and injury in different parts
of the body are prominent. Manual material handling
in the light of NIOSH equations indicate that the
workers are working above the safe limit. Postural
analysis using REBA, RULA and OVAKO methods
indicate that different body parts at specific postures
are vulnerable to injury and musculoskeletal disorders
and warrant immediate ergonomics intervention.
Keywords: Manual handling, musculoskeletal disorder,
posture, work load.
Introduction
Manual brick manufacturing in India is a very old
profession employing millions of people. As an
unorganized sector, no statistical data are available to
date as to the number of people employed, accident
rates, and other problems. Hence the only bases for
such data are through direct dialogue with the people
associated with this profession. However there are some
data in this sector in the western world. Brick or clay
product manufacturing in US ranked sixth out of the
10 highest job classifications in terms of percentage
claim for cumulative trauma disorders (Brogmus and
Mark, 1991). About 44%  of over three days injuries
reported by the brick industry (HSE, 1999) are strains,
sprains and other manual handling injuries. An
accident survey in the heavy clay sector (Brick
Development Association, 2002) indicated 1, 959
accidents in 1999 leading to the loss of 3,829 man
days (0.31%). The same group indicated that the
number of accidents increased in 2000, leading to a
loss of 4, 261 man days (0.27%). Brick making involves
crude techniques causing considerable worker drudgery
(Development Alternative, 2005). Brick workers,
especially moulders, are exposed to the sun for long
hours; additionally they are exposed to high
concentrations of dust while manually breaking coal.
There is also the risk of exposure to dust (from bottom
ash spread on the kiln) and the open fire during
manual coal feeding. The workers have to walk on 
a hot surface (top of the furnace) while monitoring 
and regulating the fire. They are also exposed to high
concentrations of Respirable Suspended Particulate
Matters (RSPM), while monitoring and regulating the 
fire, as the furnace chamber is covered with ash (ash
acts as insulator). Carrying head loads on a regular
basis causes health problems, especially in women.
The incidences of Work Related Musculoskeletal
Disorders (WMSDs) were quite common in this sector.
Investigations in a manual brick making factory,
focusing on the moulding department, indicated that
there was poor standing and lots of deviated wrist
positions, accompanied by forceful exertions (Trevelyn
and Haslam, 2001). In another study on manual brick
manufacturing (Basra and Crawford, 1995) some
potential problems were identified, such as a poorly
designed work station and frequent bending and
twisting of the trunk. Inadequate rest breaks also were
observed. Brick handling among brick layers also
showed incidences of WMSDs, which were responsible
for lost time and additional physicians’ visits (Cook et
al, 1996). Awkward postures of the back and shoulders,
and manual material handling of bricks and mortars in
these awkward postures were identified as the causes 
of WMSDs. In a study of post kiln brick sorting
activity a high level of back complaints and an
increased frequency of upper limb disorders were
observed (Ferreira and Tracy, 1991). These investigators
inferred that these disorders were the result of a large
amount of trunk bending and twisting in one plant 
and repetitive handling of several bricks at a time at
another plant. 
The industrial classification of bricks, pottery, glass 
and cement was identified as having greater risk of
inflammation of tendons of the hand, forearm or
associated tendon sheaths (Buckle and Stubbs, 1990).
Chung and Kee (2000) evaluated the lifting tasks
during fire brick manufacturing process, with a focus
on forming, heating and packing process. The group
inferred that the weight of the load significantly
influenced the incidence of back injuries. 
Thus it appears that to date there is dearth of data in
the Indian scenario about to the different risk factors
associated with manual brick manufacturing. It was
also felt necessary to probe into this area of work as it
provides an employment opportunity to thousands of
people in rural areas. For any successful intervention,
it is imperative to identify the hazards, and the level 
of risk implicit in performing the required tasks. This
study was an attempt in that direction. 
HFESA Journal ,  Ergonomics Austral ia Vol  22,  Number 1,  March-June 08
A r t i c l e s
2. Risk factors in manual brick manufacturing in India
Prabir Mukhopadhyay
17
ERGONOMICS AUSTRALIA
Method
Direct observation and activity analysis 
A modified form of Drury’s (1990) direct observation
and activity analysis was applied. The subjects were
observed in actual working conditions. The posture
assumed, the path of travel of the hand, and repetitive
activities were observed. A modified form of   body
part discomfort (Corlett and Bishop 1976) was applied
to identify discomfort in different parts, as discomfort
has been reported (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2007) to be 
a precursor to injury and musculoskeletal disorder in
the long run. Subjects were asked to rate the zone of
maximum discomfort. Each job was also analyzed by
using a Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) in which the
work was broken up into smaller components until it
could not be broken down further.
Questionnaire and interview technique
Questionnaires were developed based on the method 
of Sinclair (1975). Four versions of questionnaires were
made and validated before the final questionnaire was
determined. The final questionnaire was validated by
testing on subjects in the actual working conditions.
The time taken to fill the questionnaire, the quantum 
of information being collected and the sequence of
questions were carefully analyzed. Based on this
analysis, further modification of the questionnaire
design was made in order to extract the required
information in the shortest possible time. The
questionnaire comprised questions pertaining to
different problems, related to this profession, including
normal daily activity, pain experienced in different
body parts, injury to different body parts, working
hours, resting periods, total working duration, and
problems faced in working under the sun.
Photography of different work stations
Still and video photography of different work stations
was undertaken, with a specific focus on the postural
issues. The design issues of the existing work station
were also recorded. The photographs were later
analyzed in the laboratory. The still photographs were
used to identify the different categories of working
postures vulnerable to injury, such as bending,
twisting, and tilting the head forward. Video
photography was used to analyze the number of
repetitive movements, especially movements of the
limbs, and forward and twisting activities. The video
photography also helped in cross checking the detail 
of time and motion study done in the field.
Subjects
Forty eight subjects, all females, were selected for
measurement of different parameters. The mean age
was 28.1 years (SD = 1.8), mean stature 146.8 cm (SD
= 3.2) and mean body mass was 47.3 Kg (SD = 4.2)
respectively. As the majority of the workers were
female, while only a few males acted as supporting
staff, only females were selected for this study. 
Measurement of environmental parameters
Radiant heat was measured by using a Vernon’s Globe.
Dry and Wet Bulb Temperature was measured by using
a Whirling Psychrometer. Measurement of thermal
parameters was taken every two hours for twelve 
hours duration and the mean was calculated.
Measurement of physiological parameters
Heart rate was measured (using a 30 seconds stop
watch) by the ten beats method at the beginning of
work, and at the end of thirty minutes of carrying a 
set of bricks onto the kiln. Blood pressure was also
recorded for the same work, using a mercury
sphygmomanometer. Ideally, heart rate should have
been measured throughout the duration of the working
period. This was not feasible for two reasons.
Continuous recording of the heart rate requires a 
sport tester to be used. The female subjects had strong
objections of strapping anything on their chest. Hence
the pulse rate had to be recorded from the carotid pulse
by the ten beats method. From the activity analysis
and from a discussion with the workers, it transpired
that recording the pulse rate from the carotid pulse
would interfere with the subjects’ normal activity. It
might also be risky to record the pulse rate at some
positions like load lifting on the head and unloading
on the kiln top. Thus the idea of continuous pulse rate
monitoring had to be abandoned. Instead, from the
entire work-rest cycle, only half an hour was selected
to see the pattern of the physiological parameters. Also
it was observed that at a stretch the workers worked
for half an hour. After this they took a rest of about
10/15 minutes before starting their activity once again.
Oral temperature was recorded using a mercury
thermometer. Subjects were instructed not to eat
anything half an hour prior to measuring the
temperature. The reason for measuring oral temperature
by this method was that the subjects were familiar with
this from their previous visits to the physician, and
anything else would not be acceptable to them. Such
methods have been used previously in the Indian
scenario (Sen, 1982).
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Results
Work process in general
Most of the brick kilns in this part of the country were
of open type (Figure 1). The worker usually started
working at 3 am and continued till 11 am. After lunch
and rest they recommenced at 3 p.m. and continued 
till 7 p.m. The workers never worked continuously 
(as noted previously) but in bouts of 30 minutes,
followed by resting for 10 or 15 minutes before
resuming activity. As the workers were paid for the
number of units of bricks produced, they had a normal
tendency to work for longer hours and finish the work
sooner, so that they could move to another kiln.
Normally a group of 20-25 people worked at a kiln 
to produce 100,000 bricks. 
Figure 1. Open type brick kiln unit
Body part discomfort mapping
At the end of the day’s work, maximum pain and
discomfort was experienced in the lower back (30%)
followed by upper back (25%), shoulder (15%), elbow
(10%), and wrist/hand (10%). Pain and discomfort in
the knees was (5%) followed by neck (2.5%) and 
ankle (2.5%).
Activity analysis
There were two main steps. In the first step a brick 
was manufactured from mud (Figure 2) with the help
of a mould. This was then stacked and dried in direct
sunlight. In the second stage the dried brick was taken
to the kiln (Figure 3, 4) and stacked on top of it for
further curing and hardening. After a week the cured
bricks were removed and ready to use. Manual brick
making in this part of the country was sporadic and
based on demand. Work was carried on only during 
the summer months, and during monsoon season all
such kilns were closed. 
Figure 2a, 2b. Brick manufacture from mud
HFESA Journal ,  Ergonomics Austral ia Vol  22,  Number 1,  March-June 08
19
ERGONOMICS AUSTRALIA
HFESA Journal ,  Ergonomics Austral ia Vol  22,  Number 1,  March-June 08
Figure 4. Unloading bricks at kiln top Figure 5. Aligning raw bricks on kiln top
Figure 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d. Carrying raw bricks for curing
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On average, the workers stacked 9 bricks on their head
and carried them to the kilns. The weight of each brick
being 1.5 Kg they carried a total load of 13.5 Kg. The
mean time taken for stacking 9 bricks on the head was
8.1 seconds. The mean time taken for unloading the
same number of bricks on the kiln was 5.3 seconds.
The mean time taken for the workers to stack the
bricks on the head and run to the kiln top and unload
a similar number of bricks was found to be 25.0
seconds. The time taken for completing one full work
cycle, that is stacking the bricks on the head, running
to the kiln top and unloading and then returning 
back to the initial position was 37.9 seconds.
Physiological parameters
There was a marked increase in the post exercise heart
rate (80.8 beats per minute to 125.3 beats per minute)
after 30 minutes of work (Table 1). Similarly the
systolic blood pressure increased from 116.3 mm Hg 
to 139 mm Hg after 30 minutes. The diastolic blood
pressure increased by only a marginal amount from
80.8 mm Hg to 92.3 mm Hg even after 30 minutes 
of exercise. Oral temperature increased from 36.80 C 
to 38.10 C after 30 minutes of work.
Table 1. Mean physiological parameters before 
and after working for 30 minutes
Pre Exercise After 30 min. 
of exercise
Heart rate (beats/min) 80.8(SD=2.8) 125.3(SD=6.7)
Systolic B.P. (mm Hg) 116.3(SD=3.5) 139(SD=5.0)
Diastolic B.P. (mm Hg) 80.8(SD=4.9) 92.3(SD=2.2)
Oral temperature (0 C) 36.8(SD=0.2) 38.1(SD=0.5)
Environmental parameters
The mean Dry Bulb (DB) temperature was 35.30 C, 
and the Wet Bulb (WB) temperature 23.20C. The Globe
temperature was observed to be 43.80C (Table 2). 
Dizziness (48%) and head ache (42%) were the most
predominant heat related problems (Table 1), followed
by vomiting (5%) and heat stroke (5%). Abrasions
(36.3%) and cuts (33.2%) were the dominant injuries.
This was followed by trips/falls (18.2%) and brick
falling on the feet (6%). 
Table 2. Mean environmental temperatures
Dry Bulb (0 C) Wet Bulb (0 C) Globe (0 C) 
35.3 (SD=0.28) 23.2 (SD= 0.55) 43.8 (SD= 1.26)
Postural analysis for musculoskeletal risk factors
The entire process of manual brick manufacture was
divided into certain components. Different methods
were applied for each component to identify the risk
factors associated with a particular task. Brick making,
carrying bricks on the head to the kiln top and
unloading the bricks on kiln top and aligning them,
were the four main task components.
OVAKO working posture (Karhu et al. 1977)
Certain postures associated in brick making demanded
immediate attention (Table 3). The legs with an OVAKO
score of 6 while squatting and pressing the clay in the
mould, with repeated twisting and bending of trunk,
was a vulnerable posture. While squatting and then
standing erect, with bricks on the head, the cervical
and lumbosacral segments of the vertebral column
were another vulnerable area requiring immediate
intervention.
Rapid Entire Body Assessment (REBA) (Harnett and Mc
Atamney, 2000) and Rapid Upper Limb Assessment (RULA)
working posture analysis (Mc Atamney and Corlett, 1993)
REBA posture codes indicate that postures (Table 4) in
the stacking area like stooping forward with bricks on
the head and then standing erect (Figure 3), demands
immediate attention ( with a score of 12/12). Other
postures are also at risk (with a score of 11/11) in
manual brick making, load carriage and unloading 
and alignment (Figure 4) at kiln top. RULA posture
codes indicate that all the working postures are 
equally vulnerable with a score of 7/7 that 
warrants intervention.
National Institute of Occupational Health 
and Safety (NIOSH) load lifting equation
NIOSH equation for load lifting was applied in the case
of lifting bricks from the stacking area (Table 5) and
putting them on the head. Based on different distances
and constants, the average recommended weight lifted
was found to be 27.87 lbs (12.9 kg). This was greater
than the average weight carried by each subject (13.5
kg). The lifting index at both origin and destination 
of the lift was 1.05 and 1.08, which is more than the
limit prescribed (it should be less than 1). 
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Table 3. OVAKO working posture analysis
OVAKO Posture codes
Activity Back Arms Legs Force
Manual brick making
Cutting mud 4 4 4 2
Squatting and inserting clay in mould 4 1 6 1
Press clay and take out brick from mould 4 1 6 2
Load carriage from stacking area to kiln
Squatting to stack bricks on head 6 3 4 3
Stack bricks on head one by one 2 3 4 3
Move up 1 3 3 3
Stand erect with bricks on head 1 3 2 3
Activity at kiln top
Unloading brick with assistance 1 3 4 3
Align bricks on kiln 4 3 3 2
Table 4. REBA/RULA working posture analysis
Activity REBA posture codes RULA posture codes
Manual brick making
Cutting mud 11/11 7/7
Squatting and inserting clay in mould 7/7 6/6
Press clay and take out brick from mould 7/7 7/7
Load carriage from stacking area to kiln
Squatting to stack bricks on head 11/11 7/7
Stack bricks on head one by one 11/11 7/7
Move up 12/12 7/7
Stand erect with bricks on head 12/12 7/7
Activity at kiln top
Unloading brick with assistance 11/11 7/7
Align bricks on kiln 11/11 7/7
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Table 5. NIOSH load lifting equation, with weight in lbs, distance in inches and angle in degrees
Task Variables
Hand location Vertical Asymmetric angles (degree) Frequency Duration Object
Origin Destination Distance Origin Destination  lift/min Hrs coupling
Object weight H V H V D A A F C
30 13 40 <=10 65 15 30 0.5 <=1 Poor
Multipliers and RWL
RWL=LC X HM    X VM    X DM    X AM    X FM    X CM
Origin 28.47 51 0.77 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.90
Destination 27.87 51 1.00 0.74 0.94 0.90 0.97 0.90
Lifting Index = Object weight/RWL
Origin L1= 30 / 28.47 =1.05
Destination L1= 30 / 27.87 =1.08
H= Horizontal, V=Vertical, D=Distance, LC= Load Constant, HM= Horizontal Multiplier, VM= Vertical Multiplier,
DM= Distance Multiplier,
AM= Asymmetric Multiplier, FM= Force Multiplier, CM= Coupling Multiplier, RWL= Recommended Weight Limit,
LI= Lifting Index 
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Discussion
The relative duration of working in the sun was 
critical and this was substantiated by the elevated
physiological parameters well above the normal resting
value. The increase in heart rate after 30 minutes of
work was possibly enough to categorize it as a heavy
type of activity (Sen, 1982). The external heat of the
environment was possibly an important factor adding
to the stress level of the workers—also indicated by an
elevated oral temperature. This was quite obvious as
the radiant heat of the environment was well above the
normal value. This might be a potential risk factor for
the workers working under such conditions. This was
further substantiated by the high rate of heat related
incidences of heat stroke and other symptoms.
As regards the incidence of injuries in different parts 
of the body, the work process was primarily responsible.
There were no personal protective devices, and even a
complete absence of any protective work wear, so this
was a significant issue in the injuries that were
sustained. Since body- part discomfort is a valuable
indicator of a mismatch between the job and the
human operator Mukhopadhyay et al, 2007) it was
found that the lower back was the part that was mainly
affected, followed by upper back and other parts of the
body. This was mainly caused by repeated bending and
twisting of the trunk, leading to an enormous force
generation at the lumbosacral segment of the vertebral
column (Kumar, 2001). Pain in shoulder and forearm
was possibly the result of repeated activity of the
muscles of these parts as a result of repetitive
movements of the upper limbs. The work cycle time 
for loading and unloading was found to be very short
considering the fact that on an average the subjects
were carrying a 13.5 kg weight on their head. Such
activity under the intense heat of the sun is
physiologically very demanding and might lead 
to fatigue and accidents if proper work rest and
replenishment of fluid lost from the body is not
addressed.
Postural analysis by different methods indicated 
that most of the postures were vulnerable to
musculoskeletal disorders and injury and this demands
immediate ergonomics design intervention. Even the
NIOSH equation indicated that the weight being
handled by the subjects was above the recommended
value and demanded immediate attention. Garg et al
(1992) reported that injuries to the vertebral column
were linked to jobs which involved activities like
lifting, pushing, pulling and carrying. All these were
present in manual brick manufacturing. Investigations
by other authors (Snook et al, 1978, Kelsey et al, 1984)
indicated that repetition, twisting, or lateral bending,
for even relatively light weights are significant factors
in the genesis of low back musculoskeletal disorders
and injuries. 
Conclusion
Manual brick manufacturing in India is currently an
extremely hazardous occupation. There are hazards in
the working environment because of the high ambient
temperature, as well as hazards associated with manual
load lifting, which are well above the recommended
limit. There are vulnerable postures, in which the
workers are engaged for long periods, which further
increase the risk of injury. Complete absence of any
personal protective devices renders the workers
vulnerable to all sorts of injury associated with
material handling.
Relevance 
There is still a paucity of data about different risk
factors for musculoskeletal disorders in manual brick
manufacturing in India. Jobs involving different
awkward postures of the body along with high
environmental heat load have a strong association with
injury, disorders, a fall in productivity and the quality
of work outcomes. This study presents different risk
factors associated with these types of jobs. Therefore it
is essential to use biomechanical models at the design
stage to identify and suggest suitable ergonomics
design interventions to minimize and control such 
high risk tasks. 
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Abstract
In this paper, we have tried to identify the scope of
ergonomics design and usability for an Intensive Care
Unit (ICU) through the study of seven different
hospitals in India. The feedback received from
physicians about the usability of ventilator systems is
also discussed. Our study highlights the need to evolve
standards focusing on ergonomics design and usability
of an ICU. It is also felt that the user interface design
of medical equipment and hospital signage systems
must support culture specific and localized adaptations
for better comprehension.
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Introduction
In this paper, we are presenting the findings of our
usability study of Intensive Care Units (ICUs) in Indian
hospitals. Our study touches upon its various aspects
such as location, layout, signage system, doors,
windows, patient information boards, switchboards,
power plugs, various medical facilities and equipment.
Through this study, we have realized that there is vast
scope for enhancement of ergonomics design and
usability of an ICU and each aspect needs an individual
focus. However, presenting an overview of these
aspects will be helpful for appreciating the
complexities and challenges faced by the physicians,
ICU staff and patients. An example of this complexity
was noted in relation to the usability of ventilator
system, which is one of the most important pieces of
medical equipment used in an ICU. 
We came across many ICU standards that primarily
focus on ensuring quality of service through process
monitoring. Some of them make a passing mention 
of ergonomics design but do not provide any specific
guidelines to enhance the usability of an ICU [13].
Critical role of an intensive care unit (ICU) 
In the first instance we need to appreciate the purpose
and objectives of an ICU. Mostly the ICUs are meant to
offer emergency services to patients. ICUs are
specialty-nursing units designed, equipped and staffed
with skilled personnel for treating very critical patients
or those requiring specialized care and equipment [7].
An ICU has a cognitively complex environment [14]
like the cockpit of an aircraft or the operating room 
of a nuclear power plant where one is required to:
- monitor various systems and equipment;
- integrate and understand complex information;
- attend critically ill patients;
- judge the dynamically evolving situation; and
- take quick and accurate decisions.
Time critical
Densely populated cities in India, narrow lanes, traffic
congestion and parking problems create hurdles for
critically ill or accidentally injured patients en route 
to a hospital. In the process, such patients lose precious
time at this life critical moment. Once the critical
patient is brought to the hospital, without any further
loss of time, it should be possible to give immediate
attention and proper treatment. In this critical moment,
the usability of an ICU becomes important for efficient
and accurate treatment. 
Life critical
Poor usability increases the risks associated with
medical equipment [9]. It also results in undue
expenditure in terms of unproductive time needed to
be spent on learning how to operate the equipment 
and unsafe handling possibly resulting in accidents
[10]. Furthermore, device-induced errors can also 
injure or kill a patient [8]. 
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Emotionally stressful
ICUs have a very emotional and critical environment 
as they deal with life and death situations. The patients
and their relatives can become emotional. Their
reactions may be very sharp. Also, behaviour of
physicians and ICU staff can be directly affected by the
operating environment and physical characteristics of
medical equipment [3]. 
Need for user friendly ICUs   
Patients and their families need user-friendly
environments that have a more natural look and feel
[2]. They also expect improved décor, more privacy,
reduced environmental stressors, natural surroundings
and greater control over tasks and information. 
On the whole, we can understand how important ICUs
are and how critical ergonomics design and usability
are for its users. Our study is very relevant, particularly
in the Indian context, and it is also applicable to any
other developing country scenario.
Method
Selection of hospitals
Our study is based on seven different ICUs belonging
to different hospitals from cities and small towns from
two different states in India. This has given us a proper
representation of conditions in well-equipped and
modestly equipped hospitals. For recording purposes
the names of the hospitals are given below:
• Bharati Hospital, Sahyadri Hospital, Ratna Memorial
Hospital and Siddhi Hospital from Pune city in
Maharashtra State, India; 
• Giriraj Hospital and Jogalekar Hospital from smaller
towns namely Baramati and Shirwal in Maharashtra
State, India; and 
• People’s Group Hospital from Bhopal City in
Madhya Pradesh State, India. 
Data gathering
• Structured interviews of many physicians and ICU
staff were carried out. It was a very hectic and
tricky challenge to get access to medical
practitioners.  
• A questionnaire was designed as per the guidelines
given by Chauncey Wilson [4] to gather feedback.
• Field studies, observations of facilities and usage 
of equipment were photographed and documented.
Types of Users
Various users of an ICU have been are categorized as:
Primary users
Physicians, specialist physicians, resident doctors 
and sisters who actually use the equipment. 
Secondary users 
Intern doctors, ward boys, patients and biomedical
technicians who also assist the primary users in
maintenance of medical equipment. 
According to Jennifer Martin et al [9], even when
patients don’t operate the medical equipment, they 
are subjected to the diagnosis and treatments produced
using the equipments. Therefore even the patients are
also considered as important users of medical
equipments. 
Tertiary users
Administrators, relatives of patients, visitors who 
come in proximity to medical equipment. 
The planning team for an ICU design should include
representatives of all the users—especially patients and
their families as they are experiencing some of the
most traumatic moments of their lives [2].
Discussion
Location of an intensive care unit (ICU) in the 
hospital premise
Table 1. Floor wise location of ICUs in different
hospitals
Floor No. of ICUs
Ground 2
First 2
Second 1
Third 2
As shown in Table 1, we have observed that the ICUs
are located on different floors in different hospitals.
This compels the patients to use elevators and as a
result increases the dependency on power supply,
maintenance and smooth functioning of the elevator.
ICUs are not immediately approachable when you enter
the hospital. In many places an exclusive entrance and
parking facility is not provided. 
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Ideally, the ICUs have to be on the ground floor and
not far from the casualty department and a general
ward [7]. As recommended by Miranda et al [5] the
supporting services such as an operating theatre, the
department of radiology, the laboratories, and the
blood bank should be nearby. On the contrary, we
found that the ICUs are surrounded by random
facilities and services. There does not seem to be any
standard practice or design. Because of the unavailability
of a standard location and easy pathway to reach the
ICU, the patients and their relatives have to search 
for it, which results in delays and disturbance to 
other patients.
Figure 1. Signage for an ICU
Signage System
A good signage system is an imperative for directing
the patients and visitors through the hospital. A proper
signage system is also essential inside the ICU. It can
help the users to navigate independently through
various departments, without requiring any assistance
or disturbing the patients. But many hospitals in India
do not use signage systems. Where some signs and
symbols are used they look different in different
hospitals. One such signage board is shown in Figure 1.
Standard guidelines for hospital signage are essential
wherein the depiction of sign, colors, shapes, sizes 
and placement of signs should be consistent. Culture
specific localization of hospital signage needs to be
considered for effective communication with patients
and visitors belonging to a geographic region.
Layout and Composition of Facilities in the ICU
The typical ICU includes various facilities such as 
a procedure room, visitors’ room, counseling room,
changing rooms for nurses and physicians, a security
room, dead body room, conference room, reception,
communication centre, pantry, store, places for clean
and dirty linen, patient toilet, staff toilet, and gadget
parking area [12]. In the ICUs visited by us, we found
that the above-mentioned functions and facilities were
all arranged differently. In many cases, some of the
facilities were not provided at all. 
During our interviews with the experienced physicians,
they agreed unequivocally that the above-mentioned
functions and facilities are interrelated and
interdependent and hence should be considered at 
the time of architectural planning. Many facilities 
are created in any available space, in the built
environment of the hospital. Design of the architectural
layout along with all the facilities related to it, have 
a strong impact on overall usability and effectiveness
of an ICU.
Figure 2. Patient Information Boards
Design of Patient Information Boards
Effective communication with patients, relatives 
and visitors is vital in healthcare settings where
miscommunication may lead to misdiagnosis and
improper or delayed medical treatment [1]. 
As shown in Figure 2, patient information boards are
used to provide information about resident patients.
This information helps the family members and newly
visiting medical staff to find where their patient 
is located. 
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Figure 2 shows that the bed numbers have been hand-
written on cards that are partly or fully covered by the
cardholder. A typical information board has many 
such card-holders arranged in a grid format. Patient
information on the board can be updated in random
order. As a result, the family members of the patients
have to take a walkthrough of an entire ICU to locate
their patient. It would be ideal to have the cardholders
arranged as per the layout of the ICU. It would help 
the family members get a proper orientation and
eventually locate their patient without disturbing 
other critically ill patients.
Figure 3. ICU Doors with written instructions on
whether to push or pull them open
Door Design and Window Positions
Figure 3. shows the doors of one ICU. Figure 3A shows
the outside view of doors and Figure 3B shows the
inside view of the same doors. Figure 3A shows an
instruction in a blue color strip that says ‘Push the
Door’. Figure 3B shows another instruction that says
‘Pull the door’.
The following usability problems with the doors 
are noted below. 
• The instructions are written in Marathi, the regional
language used in the Maharashtra State of India.
This means that they may not be readable by the
physicians, staff members and visitors who cannot
understand Marathi language. These people will be
left with no option but to explore pushing, pulling
and may be even sliding the door and thus waste
valuable time. 
• The design of door itself should provide cues for
one to know whether it should be pushed or pulled
[11]. Design can transcend languages and be used
to communicate effectively with the users.
• Such doors make it difficult, especially when the
patient is taken in or out on a stretcher, as the
radius of door opening is large. Thinking logically,
sliding doors would be easier than doors which
require to be pushed or pulled.
Figure 4. Windows causing bright reflections 
in the monitors
It is essential for every ICU to have windows as the
source of natural light. It is extremely important for
the patients as about 50% of them who have stayed for
more than eight days in ICU, develop ICU psychosis [7].
It is a condition whereby a patient loses track of time. 
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At the same time, the relative positions of windows
and monitors of medical equipment should be such
that monitors won’t lose readability because of
reflections. Information displayed on the monitor must
be easily readable for the physicians. Figure 4 shows
bright reflections in the monitor which is on a shelf
opposite wide glass windows.
Design of Power Switches, Plugs and Cables
We often found that some power plugs were marked
with indications of where they belonged, or with which
equipment they needed to be used. This was because
the cables and plugs do not carry any pre-defined
colour-code or symbols for their usage. This resulted 
in a potential mix-up of power cables. As a result the
users had to stick labels—or scribble some information
using marker pens—on the power plugs and cables.
Power plugs and cables should be designed with
unique color-coding, shapes and sizes for better
identification [11]. The same approach is also
applicable to switchboards … as otherwise one 
has to operate them by trial and error.
Usability of Medical Equipment
An ICU has many medical types of equipment such 
as a ventilator system, defibrillator, multi-parameter
monitoring system, central monitoring station,
electrocardiogram (ECG) and analyzer. These are 
the most critical and commonly required medical
equipment, which provide extensive information 
to help with medication. 
In this wide variety of medical equipment, we focused
mainly on the usability of ventilator systems, as many
physicians specifically advised us to do so.  They
accorded the highest priority to the usability of this
equipment. A ventilator system gives respiratory
support to critically ill patients [10]. The usability
issues commonly observed during this survey are
summarized below.
Switches Don’t Last, Labels and Symbols Fade Away 
The ventilators are costly and are intended to be 
used for a long period in order to recover the initial
expenditure. But the users’ experience did not support
this assumption. The switches, knobs and control
panels did not last very long as a result of their
frequent use. The labels and symbols printed on the
buttons also tended to fade away [6]. 
Figure 5. Right-handed design of ventilator system
Right-handed design 
Many ventilator systems are designed only for right-
handed users. This is reflected in the layout of the
control panels. The left-handed users are disadvantaged
and not very efficient or effective with right-handed
design of control panels.  As shown in Figure 5, the
circular button and the touch-buttons are positioned
on right side of the display screen [15]. The circular
button may be difficult for left-handers to rotate.
Legibility and contrast 
Very often the physicians have to glance at the
monitor of a ventilator system from a distance. The
monitor shines and reflects the light. As a result the
readability of information displayed on the monitor is
compromised. In the case of physicians having poor
eyesight, it makes it harder to read the information.
Therefore, the legibility of information and its contrast
in the display monitor need to be enhanced.
Clutter of features 
Ventilator systems are provided with many
functionalities and features, which remain unused. 
This complicates the routine usage and results in
cognitive overload for the users.
Culture specific symbols 
Users felt that interface labels, symbols and
abbreviations were designed for western users. They
need to be localized and tuned to suite different
cultures. 
Lack of templates and intelligence 
Templates for frequently used settings, intelligent and
predictive system behavior would enable quick usage
during the moments of emergencies and in the absence
of specialist physicians [6]. 
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Mobility and portability
Users felt that ventilator systems [15] need to be more
compact, along with a robust design that supports
mobility and portability. Dismantling of a ventilator
stand can be very time-consuming.
User manuals in foreign languages 
During the interview, many sisters, intern doctors and
ward-boys reported that the user manuals were difficult
to locate when needed or manuals were not accessible
because they were in the custody of some authority.
User manuals were not readable for them when the
information was presented in a foreign language such
as English, French, or Dutch [9]. User manuals need 
to be provided in Indian languages like Hindi or other
regional languages. The ventilators could also benefit
from provision of online-help [10].
As shown in Graph 1, an increasing demand for
training as well as the provision of better user manuals
revealed the users’ helplessness in understanding the
controls and interface design. It indicated an alarming
need to focus on overall usability of medical
equipment in an intensive care unit.
Conclusion
• Figure 6 illustrates the various aspects affecting the
usability of an ICU, as separate layers of location
and layout, signage system, internal facilities,
medical equipment, control panels and software.
Each aspect must be evaluated and designed to
satisfy different human factors and user
requirements. Our study has revealed many
ergonomics and usability problems pertaining 
to these issues.
• The aspects of the ICU covered in this paper 
belong to diverse specialized disciplines namely
architecture, visual communication, interior and
furniture design, industrial / product design and
user interface design. Ergonomics design and
usability have to be accomplished through proper
orchestration and integration of multi-disciplinary
inputs.
• It is imperative to evolve an encompassing design
strategy to achieve ease, efficiency, goal fulfillment
and overall effectiveness for the users of an ICU
including physicians, patients, sisters, and ward-
boys.
• Standards focusing on ergonomics and usability
guidelines for an ICU need to be generated. Those
standards should cater to the requirements of richly
resourced ICUs in the developed countries as well 
as the modestly equipped ICUs in the developing
countries. Healthcare should not be compromised 
in any part of the world.
• In addition to the considerations for various 
human factors, the user interface design of medical
equipment and signage systems must support
culture specific and localized adaptations for better
comprehension.
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Graph 1. User feedback
Figure 6. Scope of ergonomics design and usability 
for an Intensive Care Unit (ICU)
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Introduction
Human life has always been fraught with risks. But
until the first decades of the 19th century, risks were
accepted as more or less natural in the sense that they
were directly associated with human activity rather
than with failures of systems or equipment. Accidents
happened as a part of work (which often took place at
home), during major building works, when travelling
on land or at sea – and of course during wars. This
perception changed dramatically after September 15,
1830, when William Huskisson became the first victim
of a train accident. The occasion was the opening of
the Liverpool and Manchester Railway and the train
that hit the unfortunate Mr. Huskisson was George
Stephenson’s Rocket. More accidents soon followed,
involving exploding boilers, derailings, head-on
collisions, collapsing bridges, and so on. (As an aside,
the first recorded automobile death took place in
Ireland on August 31, 1869, when a woman, Mary
Ward, was thrown from and fell under the wheels of an
experimental steam car built by her cousins. In 2002,
road traffic accidents worldwide were estimated to 
kill 1.2 million people, with at least 20 million people
being injured or disabled.)
The crucial change that took place in the 19th century
was that accidents became associated with the
technological systems that people designed, built, and
used as part of work, in the name of progress and
civilisation. Suddenly, accidents happened not only
because the people involved, today referred to as
people at the sharp end, did something wrong or
because of an act of nature, but also because a human-
made system failed. Furthermore, the failures were no
longer simple, such as a scaffolding falling down or a
wheel axle breaking. The failures were complex, in the
sense that they usually defied the immediate
understanding of the people at the sharp end. In short,
their knowledge and competence was about how to do
their work, and not about how the technology worked
or functioned. Before this change happened, people
could take reasonable precautions against accidents at
work because they understood the tools and artefacts
they used sufficiently well. After this change had
happened, that was no longer the case.
The Need to Understand Risks
Risks are real in the sense that things can and do go
wrong. We – society, organisations, and individuals –
therefore have to deal with them. But it is important
that we do this in the right way, i.e., that we
understand the risks appropriately. There are many
definitions of risk, but most of them involve the notion
of an adverse outcome or a potential negative impact
that arises from some present process or future event.
The occurrence of the event is possible rather than
certain, either because it is unknown or because it
occurs with some probability. This also means that the
loss is probable rather than certain. A risk is deemed 
to be large if either the loss is severe, if the probability
is high, or both together. Similarly, a risk is deemed to
be small if the loss is small, if the probability is low,
or both together. 
Since negative outcomes are unwanted and
undesirable, everyone – individuals, organisations, and
society – are interested in finding ways to avoid that
these outcomes happen. For example, we all know that
it is risky to drive a car in traffic or to cross a busy
street, but we do not know when a traffic accident
involving us will happen. We therefore proceed with as
much caution as we find necessary to remain safe. The
same goes for individuals at work and for the larger
socio-technical systems. But where the individual
normally can rely on common sense and experience,
socio-technical systems must employ more direct and
explicit methods In order for a system to avoid
accidents, which under normal circumstances is
tantamount to being safe, it is critical to be able to
identify and manage risks, and therefore to understand
what the risks are in the first place. Classical risk
assessment, for instance, normally starts from the
unwanted consequences, such as the top event in 
a fault tree. In order to do this, the unwanted
consequence must be recognisable either because it 
has happened before, which means that it is part of 
the individual or joint experience, or because it can 
be imagined – which usually means that it is a linear
extrapolation of something that has happened before.
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The Difficulty in Understanding Risks
Safety can be defined as the absence of adverse
outcomes (accidents, incidents, personal injuries, work
loss days, etc.), or more formally as a state in which
the risk of harm to persons or of property damage is
reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable
level. This safe state is achieved through a continuing
process of hazard identification and risk management.
Regardless of the precise definition, a critical
prerequisite for safety is the ability to identify in
advance the events that may lead to adverse outcomes,
as well as the outcomes themselves. This is, indeed,
what risk assessment is all about, and over the years 
a large number of methods and techniques have been
developed to make this process more efficient and
reliable. Methods and techniques are, however, of
limited value unless they are based on an adequate
understanding of the domain and the types of work
involved. No risk assessment methods can be applied 
in a mechanically or unthinking fashion. 
On the contrary, effective risk assessment depends
critically on the ability of investigators and analysts 
to imagine what can possibly go wrong. This ability, 
or requisite imagination (Adamski & Westrum, 2003),
comprises three steps. The first step is to understand
what the problem is or indeed to appreciate that there
is a problem at all. The second step is to understand
the “mechanisms” or the ways in which the adverse
outcomes can arise, to envisage the consequences, and
to differentiate between large and small risks. The third
and final step is to think of or find the means which
can be used either to reduce or eliminate the risk, or 
to protect against the consequences. If one or more 
of these steps fail, the risk may not be noticed until
something happens, at which time it is usually too late
to do anything about it. Two characteristic examples
will hopefully make clear what the three steps mean.
An uncomplicated risk: Smoking and cancer
As an example of a risk that is relative easy to
comprehend, even for non-specialists, consider the
relation between smoking and lung cancer. Ever since
the publication of the British doctors study in the
1950s, it has been common knowledge – except,
perhaps, in the tobacco industry – that tobacco
smoking increases the risk of lung cancer. (But notice
that before this study, few people considered smoking a
risk. The study established an irrefutable statistical and
causal relation between smoking and lung cancer.) The
way in which this happens, the “mechanism”, is well
described and well understood; it is easy to envisage
the consequences and therefore to differentiate between
large and small risks, for instance between active and
passive smoking. Finally, the solution to the problem is 
also known and in itself quite uncomplicated, although
it sometimes seem to be difficult to apply individually.
(This therefore nicely illustrates that knowing that a
risks exists is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
for reducing or eliminating it.) The relation between
smoking and cancer is nevertheless a risk that is easy
to understand. 
A complicated risk: Global warming
We can use another kind of “smoking” as an example
of a risk that it is difficult to understand. Global
warming, also known as the greenhouse effect, is the
phenomenon that changes in the levels of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere can lead to changes in the
surface temperature of our planet. Although it is the
general consensus of scientists and experts, such as 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, that
global warming is a reality, it nevertheless remains a
fiercely debated issue. There are still many people,
well-known writers, scientists, and politicians among
them, that flatly deny the existence of global warming.
In terms of the three steps mentioned above, already
the first seems to be hard; it seems to be difficult to
acknowledge that there is a problem at all. (This may,
of course, be due to other reasons, such as economic
interests and political expediency; the problem may
thus be understood, but despite that not acknowledged.)
So while for some people the problem is real, for others
it is only an environmentalist fantasy.
The second step is to understand the “mechanisms” and
the ability to envisage the consequences. As far as the
mechanisms are concerned, they have been known
since the Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius in 1895
presented a paper to the Stockholm Physical Society
entitled “On the influence of carbonic acid in the air
upon the temperature of the ground.” (The paper was
published the following year. Yet it is a surprise to
many people today that the greenhouse effect was
described so long ago.) As far as the effects are
concerned, estimates of their magnitude vary
considerably; some even see global warming as a
positive development (Arrhenius was in fact of that
opinion himself). The third step is also difficult, since 
it is not easy to think of ways in which the risk or the
outcomes can be reduced. (In this case, abandoning the
collective “smoking” that leads to global warming may
be even more difficult than in the case of individual
smokers.) All in all, global warming is an example of 
a risk that is difficult to comprehend.
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Large and small risks
Practically all industries explicitly deal with and
acknowledge the serious risks,  mostly because they
understand the benefits of doing so, but sometimes
simply because they have to. This has over many years
established a practical understanding in the perception
and handling of risks across industries and domains.
One example of that is the ALARP (As Low As
Reasonably Practicable) principle, where the
determination of what is “reasonably practicable”
reflects a combination of economic, practical, and
ethical concerns.
The same does not go for risks with less spectacular
outcomes. In these cases it is often difficult to
understand what the problem is, or sometimes even 
to see that there is a problem at all – at least not until
something has happened. It is the irony of risk
assessment that the success of eliminating the large
problems, where the “mechanisms” are easy to
understand, inevitably and unfortunately leaves the
problems that are harder to understand. Adverse
outcomes are not always due to cause-effect chains 
or a linear propagation of the effects of a malfunction,
but may also arise from unusual combinations of
conditions that involve poorly understood
characteristics of the socio-technical systems. 
If socio-technical systems were relatively stable and
only changed slowly, the experience from accidents
and incidents that happened would over time be
sufficient to ensure an acceptable level of safety.
Unfortunately, industrialised societies continue to
develop and the socio-technical systems become ever
more complex. This means that the risks also change
and that accumulated experience never will be
sufficient. Since risk assessment and accident analysis
methods necessarily are a product of accumulated
experience, there will unfortunately and invariably be
a lag between the changes in the real world and the
corresponding changes or renewals or updates of
models and methods. In other words, even if the risks
of a system have been fully understood at one point 
in time (and even that may be debatable), this will not
be sufficient to guarantee a safe state in the future. 
The growing complexity of socio-technical
systems
One useful characterisation – if not quite an
explanation – of this development was given by the
American sociologist Charles Perrow in a book called
Normal Accidents (Perrow, 1984). The fundamental
thesis of the book was that the industrialised societies,
and in particular the technological environments that
provided the foundation for those societies, by the end
of the 1970s had become so complex that accidents
were bound to occur. Accidents were thus an inevitable
part of using and working with complex systems,
hence should be considered as normal rather than rare
occurrences. Since Perrow published his analyses
neither the socio-technical systems, nor the problems
that follow, have become any simpler.
Perrow built his case by going through a massive set of
evidence from various types of accidents and disasters.
The areas included were nuclear power plants,
petrochemical plants, aircraft and airways, marine
accidents, earthbound systems (such as dams, quakes,
mines, and lakes), and finally exotic systems (such as
space, weapons and DNA). The list was quite
formidable, even in the absence of major accidents that
occurred later, such as Challenger, Chernobyl, and
Zebrügge. 
Perrow proposed two dimensions to characterise
different types of accidents: interactiveness and
coupling. With regard to the interactiveness, a complex
system – in contrast to a linear system – was
characterised by the following:
• Indirect or inferential information sources. 
• Limited isolation of failed components. 
• Limited substitution of supplies and materials. 
• Limited understanding of some processes (associated
with transformation processes). 
• Many control parameters with potential interaction. 
• Many common-mode connections of components not
in production sequence. 
• Personnel specialization limits awareness of
interdependencies. 
• Proximate production steps. 
• Tight spacing of equipment. 
• Unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops. 
According to Perrow, complex systems were difficult to
understand and comprehend and were furthermore
unstable in the sense that the limits for safe operation
(the normal performance envelope) were quite narrow.
Perrow contended that we have complex systems
basically because we do not know how to produce the
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same output by means of linear ones. And once built,
we keep them because we have made ourselves
dependent on them. 
Systems can also be described with respect to their
coupling, which can vary between being loose or tight.
The meaning of coupling is that subsystems and/or
components are connected or depend upon each other
in a functional sense. Thus, tightly coupled systems are
characterised by the following: 
• Buffers and redundancies are part of the design,
hence deliberate. 
• Delays in processing not possible. 
• Sequences are invariant. 
• Substitutions of supplies, equipment, personnel is
limited and anticipated in the design. 
• There is little slack possible in supplies, equipment,
and personnel. 
• There is only one method to reach the goal. 
• Tightly coupled systems are difficult to control
because an event in one part of the system quickly
will spread to other parts. 
Perrow used these two dimensions of interactions and
coupling to illustrate differences among various types
of systems, cf. Figure 1.
The worst possible combination in terms of risk and
accident potential is, of course, a complex and tightly
coupled system. Perrow's prime example of that was
the nuclear power plant, with Three Mile Island
accident as a case in point. Other systems that
belonged to the same category were, e.g., aircraft and
chemical plants. It was characteristic, and probably not
a coincidence, that all the systems Perrow described in
the book were tightly coupled and only differed with
respect to their complexity, i.e., they were mostly in 
the upper right quadrant.
Perrow’s thesis, as expressed by Figure 1, is relevant
for risk assessment methods since the understanding 
of risk, either in accident investigation or in risk
assessment, must be able to account for the nature of
interactions and the degree of coupling in the system.
If we, for the sake of argument, refer to the four
quadrants of Figure 1, then it is clear that systems in
the lower left quadrant in important respects differ
from systems in the upper right quadrant. A method
that may be adequate to understand risks and adverse
outcomes in a system in the lower left quadrant, such
as a person being injured while working at an
assembly line, is unlikely to be sufficient to explain
risks and adverse outcomes in a system in the upper
right quadrant, such as an event at a nuclear power
plant serious enough to be rated on the International
Nuclear Event Scale (INES). (Even though the converse
is not necessarily true, it may be inefficient to use the
more complex and powerful methods to investigate
accidents or assess risks in simple systems.) The
diagram therefore provides an external frame of
reference for risk assessment methods in addition to
the more traditional requirements such as consistency,
reliability, usability, etc. 
In the description proposed by Perrow (1984), the
notion of coupling is relatively straightforward. But 
the notion of complexity must be used with some care,
since it can refer either to the epistemological or the
ontological complexity (Pringle, 1951), i.e., either the
complexity of the description or the supposedly “true”
complexity of the system. For practical reasons it is
preferable to use a different concept, namely how easy
it is to manage or control the system, where the
extremes are tractable and intractable systems. A
system, or a process, is tractable if the principles of
functioning are known, if descriptions are simple and
with few details, and most importantly if the system
does not change while it is being described. Conversely,
a system or a process is intractable if the principles of
functioning are only partly known or even unknown, if
descriptions are elaborate with many details, and if the
system may change before the description is completed.
A good example of a tractable system is the normal
functioning of a post office, or the operation of a home
furnace. Similarly, a good example of an intractable
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system is the outage at a NPP or the activities in a
hospital emergency department. In the latter cases the
activities are not standardised and change so rapidly
that it is never possible to produce a detailed and
complete description (Wears et al., 2006). 
Using this modification of the terminology, we can
propose a new version of Perrow’s diagram, as shown
in Figure 2. (Note that this also means that some of 
the examples used by Perrow have to change position;
in addition, some examples (e.g., nuclear weapons
accidents) have been deleted, while others (financial
markets) have been introduced. These changes are,
however, illustrative rather than exhaustive.)
Following this principle, risk assessment methods
should be characterised in terms of the systems – or
conditions – they can account for. For instance, a
simple linear model – such as the domino model
(Heinrich, 1931) – can be used to account for certain
types of risks and not for others. The domino model 
is suitable for systems – hence for accidents – that 
are loosely coupled and tractable. This is not very
surprising, since most systems were of that type at the
time the domino model was developed. Nuclear power
plants considered as systems are, however, tightly
coupled and more or less intractable and require
models and risk assessment methods that are capable
of accounting for these features. It is therefore
reasonable to characterise investigation methods in
terms of which applications they can account for. 
While this will not by itself determine whether one
method is “better” than another, it will make it possible
to choose a method that is suitable for a specific
purpose and/or system and thereby also to exclude
methods that are unable to meet the requirements of 
a given assignment.
The Power of Risk Assessment Methods
When problems are difficult to understand, it also
becomes difficult to envisage the consequences and 
to pinpoint the significant risks. The events that one
would want to avoid may first of all only occur very
infrequently, cf., Westrum's (2006) notion of irregular
threats. The events may even belong to the category 
of rare events – meaning that they are almost never
repeated. Since their aetiology defies traditional
explanations or accident models, it is usually difficult
both to determine what consequences may obtain and
to assess their likelihood. Finally, even when the risks
can be assessed, the absence of easily understandable
causes makes it hard to propose concrete and cost-
efficient countermeasures. Without a clear focus, it is
very difficult to know how to respond.
The problem is not made easier by the ongoing change
from linear to non-linear accident and safety models.
This change is a consequence of the growing
recognition that accidents can be due to couplings or
interactions among functions or events that are not 
in themselves failures or malfunctions, hence are not
found by traditional risk analyses. One way of
expressing that is to note that accidents more often are
due to usual actions under unusual circumstances than
to unusual actions under usual circumstances. In other
words, the explanations cannot be found nicely tucked
away in a single part of a socio-technical system, such
as the operator or the interface, but are rather due to
the ways in which normal performance variability can
combine in unexpected ways. For risk assessment this
creates a need for models and methods that can
explain how adverse events can arise from normal
performance variability as well as from failures and
malfunctions. 
The description of three steps in risk assessment,
acknowledging that a problem exists, understanding
the “mechanisms” and differentiating various
consequences, and finding effective means, is
applicable to both linear and non-linear accident types.
But if it is hard to understand the “mechanisms” for
classical risks, it is even more challenging for the risks
that are described as emerging from more complex,
socio-technical systems. Yet it is essential that we
become able to do that, not only on the level of
analysis but also on the levels of management and 
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policy making. A failure to do so will limit safety
management to be reactive and risk analyses to be
nothing more than extensions of error counting. Yet
failure is not an option, neither in what we do, nor in
how we do it.
Changing notions of risk and safety
Most of the methods for risk assessment and accident
investigation that are used today in safety critical
industries have their origin in the 1960s. This was the
period where new analysis methods were required to
match the growing complexity, and therefore also the
growing risk, of technological systems. Examples are
Fault Trees, which were developed in 1961 to evaluate
the launch control system for the Minuteman ICBM (cf.
Leveson, 1995), Hazard and Operability Analysis
(HAZOP) which was developed by Imperial Chemical
Industries in England in the early 1960s (CISHC, 1977),
and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) which
was originally developed by the US military in 1949
but later superseded by the Failure Mode, Effects and
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) (MIL-STD-1629A, 1980). 
Another period of rapid growth occurred in the
beginning of the 1980s, mainly in response to the 
TMI accident in 1979. This led to the recognition that
human factors and human errors played a significant
role in system safety, hence that it was necessary for
risk assessment and accident investigation methods to
go beyond the technological system. The concern for
the human factor was later extended to cover
organisations and organisational factors as well, with
the prominence of ‘safety culture’ as a good example.
The direct motivation was also in this case a serious
adverse event, namely the Chernobyl accident in 1986.
Since the mid-1990s there has been an additional
growth, although more often incremental than
innovative. This growth has taken place to meet the
perceived need among researchers and practitioners 
of a re-orientation in thinking about safety, in order 
to develop methods and approaches that are both more
efficient in use and better grounded in their concepts
and constructs. 
Some of the major changes and developments since 
the mid-1990s have been: 
• An increasing emphasis of the organisational factor,
spurred by Jim Reason’s book on organisational
accidents (Reason, 1997); 
• the increasing importance of software 
(e.g., the concept of Safeware; Leveson, 1995);
• the emphasis on high reliability organisations, 
(e.g., Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999);
• the changing perspective on causality, moving 
from sequential models to systemic models
(Hollnagel, 2004);
• the associated change in view on “human error”,
from the “old” look to the “new” look (Dekker,
2006);
• the change from training in specific skills to
training in general communication and
collaboration (Helmreich, Merritt & Wilhelm, 
1999); and
• the change from reactive to proactive safety, 
as marked by resilience engineering, (Hollnagel,
Woods & Leveson, 2006).
In the same period, that is, since the mid-1990s, the
growing complexity of socio-technical systems has 
also necessitated the development of more powerful
accident investigation and risk assessment methods and
a revision of the underlying analytical principles. This
complexity, which was aptly diagnosed by Perrow
(1984), has unfortunately often been marked by serious
accidents, and shows no sign of abating. Some of the
better known examples are the JCO accident at Tokai-
Mura, Japan (1999), the space shuttle Columbia disaster
(2003), and the Überlingen mid-air collision (2002) –
plus literally thousands of small and large accidents in
practically every industrial domain. This development
has not been isolated to a specific domain but can be
found in many different industries and service functions.
One consequence of this has been the realisation that
accident investigation and risk assessment are two
sides of the same coin, in the sense that they consider
the same events or phenomena either after they have
happened (retrospectively) or before they happen
(prospectively). In the prospective case there is, of
course, the possibility that an event may never occur;
indeed, the main rationale for risk assessment is to
ensure that this is the case. The dependency between
accident investigation and risk assessment has been
emphasised both by the so-called second generation
HRA methods (in particular ATHEANA, Cooper et al.,
1996; CREAM, Hollnagel 1998; and MERMOS, Le Bot,
Cara & Bieder, 1999), and is also a central premise 
for Resilience Engineering (Hollnagel, Woods &
Leveson, 2006). 
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Development of New Accident Analysis 
and Risk Assessment Methods
One reason for the development of new methods and
approaches has been the inability of established
methods to account for novel types of accidents and
incidents. Another reason has been a lack of efficiency,
in the sense that recommendations and precautions
based on the usual explanations have not lead to the
desired effects and improvements. A third reason has
been new theoretical insights, although this rarely has
happened independently of the former.
In the two cases the inability and/or lack of efficiency
of existing methods is a consequence of the continued,
rapid development of socio-technological systems, in
turn driven by a combination of technological
innovation, commercial considerations, and user
demands. This contrasts with risk assessment and
safety management methods that develop at a much
more moderate pace – if at all – which means that 
they rarely are able to represent or address the actual
complexity of industrial systems. To the extent that
methods develop, it is usually as a delayed reflection of
“new” types of accidents. The outcome can be that new
methods focus on a specific, salient factor of an event
(e.g., violations after Chernobyl), or that they become
more comprehensive by trying to draw together 
the collective experience and changes in view 
(e.g., second generation HRA).
In order to determine whether a given method is
adequate for a given system and scenario, it is
necessary to be able to characterise both. A system –
or a scenario – can conveniently be described using the
dimensions of coupling and managability, cf., Figure 2
above. For the sake of this discussion, we will assume
that the dimensions can be considered as binary. This
leads to the following four classes of systems.
• Systems that are loosely coupled and tractable
(lower left quadrant).
• Systems that are tightly coupled and tractable
(upper left quadrant).
• Systems that are loosely coupled and intractable
(lower right quadrant).
• Systems that are tightly coupled and intractable
(upper right quadrant).
The various accident investigation and risk assessment
methods can in a similar manner be characterised in
terms of the assumptions they make about the nature
of risks. For instance, whether risks are seen as being
due to single failures and malfunctions, to human
factors, to combinations of failures and weakened
defences, or to systemic failures. Combining these
characterisations gives rise to the following
considerations.
Methods suitable for systems that 
are loosely coupled and tractable
In terms of frequency or numbers, most systems are
even today loosely coupled and tractable. Many of the
commonly used investigation methods are best suited
for systems with those characteristics – or even
explicitly assume that this is the case. In practical
terms this implies that it must be possible to provide 
a more or less complete description of the system and
to account for events (e.g., failures or malfunctions) in
a one-by-one or element-by-element fashion. While
these assumptions make for methods that are easy or
simple in terms of use, it also means that such methods
are inadequate for systems in high-risk domains, such
as nuclear power production, chemical production, or
air traffic management. 
Out of the many types of methods that are adequate
for loosely coupled and tractable systems, a number 
of characteristic subtypes can be distinguished.
Methods that focus on the identification of failed barriers
The Accident Evolution and Barrier Function (AEB;
Svensson, 2001) is a method that focuses on barriers
and/or defences and explains accidents as the result 
of failed or deficient barriers. It is primarily an
accident investigation method that describes the
evolution towards an accident or incident as a series 
of interactions between humans and technical systems.
The interactions are represented as failures,
malfunctions or errors that could lead to or did result
in an accident. The method forces analysts to integrate
human and technical systems simultaneously when
performing an accident analysis.
The method starts by modelling the accident evolution
in a flow diagram. The AEB method only models errors
and therefore does not work with or represent the full
event sequence. The flow chart initially consists of
empty boxes in two parallel columns, one for the
human systems and one for the technical systems. The
second phase consists of the barrier function analysis.
In this phase, the barrier functions are identified as 
the failures, malfunctions or errors that constitute the
accident evolution, i.e., as error boxes. In general, the
sequence of error boxes in the diagram follows the
time order of events. Between each pair of successive
error boxes there is a possibility to arrest the evolution
towards an incident/accident. According to the AEB
model, the same barrier function can be performed 
by different barrier function systems. Correspondingly,
a barrier function system may perform different barrier
functions. 
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The result of an AEB analysis is a list of broken barrier
functions, the reasons for why there were no barrier
functions or why the existing ones failed, and to
suggestions for  improvements.
Methods that focus on human error
HERA (Human Error in ATM) is a an examples of a
method that focus on human error as the primary
contributor to risks and adverse events (Isaac, Shorrock
& Kirwan, 2002). The purpose of HERA is to identify
and quantify the impact of the human factor in
incident/accident investigation, safety management and
prediction of potential new forms of errors arising from
new technology. Human error is seen as a potential
weak link in the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system.
Measures must therefore be taken to prevent errors and
their impact, and to maximise other human qualities
such as error detection and recovery. HERA is
predicated on the notion that human error is the
primary contributor to accidents and incidents.
The HERA method comprises the following steps:
1. Defining the error type.
2. Defining the error or rule breaking or violation
behaviour through a flowchart.
3. Identifying the Error Detail through a flowchart.
4. Identifying the Error Mechanism and associated
Information Processing failures through flowcharts.
5. Identifying the tasks from tables.
6. Identifying the Equipment and Information from
tables.
7. Identifying all the Contextual Conditions through 
a flowchart and tables.
The outcome of a HERA analysis is the identification 
of human errors and violations, with quantitative data
on the relative frequency of error types and working
conditions.
Methods that focus on root causes in isolation
The purpose of root cause analysis (e.g., Wilson et al.,
1993) is to identify the deficiencies in a safety
management system that, if corrected, would prevent
the same and similar accidents from occurring. Root
cause analysis is a systematic process that uses the
facts of the accident to determine the most important
reasons or causes. 
1. Determine sequence of events.
2. Define causal factors.
3. Analyse each causal factor’s root causes.
4. Analyse each root cause’s generic causes.
5. Develop and evaluate corrective actions.
6. Report and implement corrective actions.
The result of a root cause analysis if the identification
of specific (root) causes that then can be made the
object of specific remedial or corrective action. 
Methods that focus on root causes in combination
Although it in some cases may be sufficient to look 
for and find specific causes, most industrial systems 
are designed so that single failures will not constitute 
a risk or lead to an accidents. Risks are therefore more
often due to a combination of individual failures, 
and methods are therefore needed that can
accommodate that.
One example of such methods is HINT (Takano,
Sawayanagi & Kabetani, 1994), which is based on 
the Japanese version of the the Human Performance
Enhancement System (HRES; INPO, 1989). The overall
principle of HINT is to make a root cause analysis of
small events to identify trends, and to use this as a
basis for proactive prevention of accidents. The same
principles can be found in SAFER (Yoshizawa, 1999),
although the latter method has a wider scope, and
therefore may be applicable to accidents in tightly
coupled systems as well.
The HINT method comprises the following four steps. 
1. Understand the event. 
2. Collect and classify causal factor data. 
3. Causal analysis, using root cause analysis. 
4. Proposal of countermeasures.
The method differs from the traditional root cause
analysis by focusing on minor human error events, 
i.e., on incidents rather than accidents. By supporting 
a trend analysis of these events, it becomes possible 
to consider safety proactively and to focus on the
prevention of serious accidents.
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Methods suitable for systems that are tightly 
coupled and tractable
The increasing frequency of non-trivial accidents
during the 1980s and 1990s made it clear that
explanations in terms of sequences or chains of causes
and effects were insufficient. This also meant that risk
assessment could not be limited to looking for single
failures or malfunctions – whether of technical
components or humans. In order to be able to deal
with the increasingly complex systems, it was
necessary to account for how combinations of multiple
sequences of events, or of events and latent conditions,
could arise. This led to the proposal of complex linear
models, sometimes also called epidemiological models
(Hollnagel, 2004). The two major types of methods
suitable for tightly coupled and tractable systems are
associated with the Swiss cheese model and the Man-
Technology-Organisation (MTO) model. A third and
principally different approach is the Cognitive
Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM), which
also can be seen as a precursor of methods applicable
to tightly coupled, intractable systems. 
The Swiss cheese model (SCM)
One of the best known accident investigation methods
of the 1990s is associated with the so-called Swiss
Cheese model (Reason, 1990). This model represents 
an organization's defences against failure as a series 
of barriers, represented as slices of Swiss cheese. (To be
precise, this must be the Emmenthaler cheese, which is
a medium-hard cheese with characteristic large holes.)
The holes in the cheese slices represent weaknesses in
individual parts of the system that are assumed to vary
continually in size and position in the slices. The holes
can therefore also be seen as representing the risks in 
a system. According to this analogy, an accident can
happen when holes in each of the slices momentarily
align, permitting “a trajectory of accident opportunity”,
so that a hazard passes through all of the holes in all
of the defenses, leading to a failure.
The basic method for using the SCM is to trace
backwards from the accident. The analysis looks for
two main phenomena: active failures, which are the
unsafe acts committed by people (slips, lapses, fumbles,
mistakes, and procedural violations); and latent
conditions, which arise from decisions made by
designers, builders, procedure writers, and top level
management. Latent conditions can translate into error
provoking conditions within the local workplace and
they can create long-lasting holes or weaknesses in the
defences. Unlike active failures, whose specific forms
are often hard to foresee, latent conditions can be
identified and remedied before an adverse event occurs. 
Understanding this can support proactive rather than
reactive risk management. There are several specific
methodologies associated to the Swiss cheese model,
the best known being the TRIPOD method (Hudson,
Primrose & Edwards, 1994).
MTO (Människa-Teknologi-Organisation or 
Man-Technology-Organisation)
Another method is the so-called MTO-analysis, which
explicitly considers how human, organisational, and
technical factors can interact to constitute a risk, and
therefore also serve to explain accidents that have
happened (Bento, 1992; Rollenhagen, 1995). An MTO
investigation comprises three methods:
1. Structured analysis by use of an event- and 
cause-diagram.
2. Change analysis by describing how events have
deviated from earlier events or common practice.
3. Barrier analysis by identifying technological and
administrative barriers which have failed or 
are missing.
The first step in an MTO-analysis is to develop the
event sequence longitudinally and illustrate the event
sequence in a block diagram. Then, to identify possible
technical and human causes of each event and draw
these vertically to the events in the diagram, i.e., as
factors or conditions influencing the event. The next
step is to make a change analysis, i.e. to assess how
events in the accident progress have deviated from
normal situation, or common practice. Further, to
analyse which technical, human or organisational
barriers have failed or were missing during the
accident progress. The basic questions in the analysis
are how the continuation of the accident sequence
could have been prevented, and what the organisation
could have done in the past in order to prevent the
accident.
The last step in the MTO-analysis is to identify and
present recommendations. These should be as realistic
and specific as possible, and might be technical, human
or organisational. The MTO analysis thus produces a
detailed description and a clarification of factors 
that either led to or contributed to the accident. 
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Cognitive Reliability and Error Assessment 
Method (CREAM)
CREAM was developed to be used both predictively
and retrospectively (Hollnagel, 1998). Unlike the Swiss
cheese and the MTO approaches, CREAM has a clearly
defined theoretical basis in the Contextual Control
Model (COCOM). This emphasises that risks are a
function of the degree of control in a socio-technical
system, and associates the degree of control with four
different modes called strategic, tactical, opportunistic,
scrambled, respectively. It is assumed that a lower
degree of control corresponds to less reliable
performance. The level of control is mainly determined
by the Common Performance Conditions (CPC), i.e., by
external factors rather than by internal failure
probabilities. The retrospective use of CREAM (accident
investigation) is based on a clear distinction between
what can be observed (called phenotypes) and what
must be inferred (called genotypes). The genotypes used
in CREAM are divided into three categories: individual,
technological and organisational, corresponding to the
MTO triplet.
The procedure for CREAM for accident investigation
comprises the following steps:
1. Produce a description of what actually happened
2. Characterise Common Performance conditions
3. Produce a time-line description of significant events
4. Select all actions of interest
5. For each action, identify failure mode (this is done
iteratively)
6. For each failure mode, find relevant antecedent-
consequent links (this is done recursively)
7. Provide overall description and draw conclusions.
The analysis can be documented by a graph, or a
network, of antecedent actions (functions) and
conditions that together constitute an effective
explanation of the accident. The graph shows how
various actions and conditions affected each other 
in the given situation. The use of CREAM for risk
assessment basically follows the same approach,
leading to a value for the failure probability (Fujita &
Hollnagel, 2004).
Methods suitable for systems that are loosely 
coupled and intractable
There are no methods applicable to socio-technical
systems in this category. The reason for that has to 
do with the historical development of accident
investigation and risk assessment methods. At the
beginning, effectively in the 1930s, industrial systems
were loosely coupled and tractable. As technologies
and societies developed, systems became more tightly
coupled through vertical and horizontal integration 
and at the same time less tractable because new
technologies allowed faster operations and more
extensive automation. The latter meant in particular
that they became more or less self-regulating under
normal conditions, which reduced tractability. Since
accidents ‘followed’ these developments, methods were
developed to be able to address the new problems.
Conversely, few if any accident of note took place in
loosely coupled, intractable systems, hence no methods
were developed to account for that. The basic reason is
that such systems are social rather than technological,
e.g., universities, research companies, and the like.
They are therefore not designed in the same sense, nor
do they have the potential for accidents with direct
consequences for human life and/or material.
Methods suitable for systems that are tightly 
coupled and intractable
The continuously growing complexity of socio-
technical systems, and the consequent reduction of
tractability, has led to a fundamental change in the
approach to risk and safety.   The most prominent
example of that is the development resilience
engineering (Hollnagel, Woods & Leveson, 2006), 
which changes the focus from failures and actions
gone wrong to the usefulness of normal performance
variability. With respect to accident investigations this
means that the aim is to understand how adverse
events can be the result of unexpected combinations of
variations in normal performance, thereby avoiding the
need to look for a human error or a root cause. This
view is often referred to as a systemic view. There are
presently two main proposals for a method, STAMP
and FRAM.
System-theoretic model of accidents (STAMP)
The hypothesis underlying STAMP is that system
theory is a useful way to analyze accidents,
particularly system accidents (Leveson, 2004).
Accidents occur when external disturbances,
component failures, or dysfunctional interactions
among system components are not adequately handled
by the control system. Safety is viewed as a control
problem, and is managed via constraints by a control
structure embedded in an adaptive socio-technical
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system. Understanding why an accident occurred
requires determining why the control structure was
ineffective. Preventing future accidents requires
designing a control structure that will enforce the
necessary constraints. Systems are viewed as
interrelated components that are kept in a state of
dynamic equilibrium by feedback loops of information
and control. STAMP thus uses a feedback control
system as a specific causal model. A STAMP analysis
proceeds along the following lines: 
1. In teleological systems, various subsystems maintain
constraints which prevent accidents.
2. If an accident has occurred, these constraints have
been violated.
3. STAMP investigates the systems involved, especially
human-organisational subsystems, to identify
missing or inappropriate features (those which fail 
to maintain the constraints).
4. It proceeds through analysing feedback & control
operations.
The most basic component of STAMP is not an event,
but a constraint. Risks and accidents are therefore
viewed as resulting from interactions among
components that violate the system safety constraints.
The control processes that enforce these constraints
must limit system behavior to the safe changes and
adaptations implied by the constraints. Inadequate
control may result from missing safety constraints,
inadequately communicated constraints, or from
constraints that are not enforced correctly at a 
lower level.
Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM)
If it is acknowledged that risks and accidents can arise
from unexpected combinations of normal performance
variability, then the assumption of causality must be
partly abandoned. If risks and accidents cannot always
be linked to failures and malfunctions of components,
then methods should not be restricted to causal
explanations. The alternative is to develop methods for
accident investigation and risk assessment that describe
system functions rather than components or structures,
and that can account for the non-linear propagation 
of events. This can, for instance, be achieved by using
functional resonance instead of causality, and by 
using normal performance variability instead of
malfunctioning (e.g., Hollnagel, 2004; Sawaragi,
Horiguchi & Hina, 2006).
The method associated with FRAM proceeds along 
the following steps:
1. Define the purpose of modelling and describe the
situation being analysed. The purpose can be either
risk assessment of accident investigation.
2. Identify essential system functions and characterise
each function by six basic parameters (input, output,
time, control, pre-conditions, resources).
3. Characterise the (context dependent) potential
variability using a checklist. Consider both normal
and worst case variability.
4. Define functional resonance based on possible
dependencies (couplings) among functions.
5. Identify barriers for variability (damping factors) 
and specify required performance monitoring.
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The analysis uncovers dependencies among functions
or tasks that normally are missed. It also identifies the
information needed for the investigation. The concrete
result can be a graphical rendering of how the accident
developed and/or a detailed written description
(Nouvel, Travadel & Hollnagel, 2007). The basis for 
a risk assessment is the performance variability of
normal actions.
Discussion and Conclusions
One way of summarising the characterisation of the
methods described above is to map them onto the
diagram shown in Figure 2. The result of that is can 
be seen in Figure 3. This shows that most methods are
applicable to tractable systems, or rather that most
methods assume that the systems are tractable.
Conversely, one may conclude that these methods
should not be used for intractable systems, since they
will not be able to produce adequate explanations.
Several of the commonly used methods, including root
cause analysis, AEB, and HERA, also require that
systems only are loosely coupled. These methods are
therefore unable to account for the consequences of
tight couplings, hence unable adequately to explain
accidents in systems of that type.
It makes sense that any method would be just about
adequate for the typical type of problems at the time it
was developed. Indeed, there would be little reason to
develop a method that was more complex or more
powerful than required, not least because it would 
be difficult to imagine what that should comprise. 
As argued in the beginning, new methods are usually
developed because the existing methods at some 
point in time encounter problems for which they 
are inefficient or inadequate. This, in turn, happens
because the socio-technical systems where accidents
happen continue to develop and to become more
complex and more tightly coupled. The inevitable
result is that even new methods after a while become
underpowered because the nature of the problems
change, although they may have been perfectly
adequate for the problems they were developed 
for in the first place.
The position of the various methods on the diagram 
in Figure 3 presents a characterisation of the methods
using the two dimensions of coupling and
manageability, and thereby indirectly represents the
developments of socio-technical systems since the
1980s – and indeed since the 1930s. Without going
into the details of this development, the lower left
quadrant can be seen as representing industrial systems
before the middle of the 20th Century, i.e., before the
large scale application of information technology.
The development since then has been one of tighter
coupling (moving up into the upper left quadrant) 
and a loss of tractability (moving right into the 
upper right quadrant). This has in turn required 
the development of new methods, as shown in 
the diagram.
The position of a method reflects the assumptions
behind the method, specifically what has been called
the accident model. The arguments for each method
were presented above. To illustrate the significance of
the position, consider for instance the two extremes
RCA and FRAM. 
• Root cause analysis (RCA) assumes that adverse
outcomes can be described as the outcome of a
sequence (or sequences) of events or a chain (or
chains) of causes and effects. The investigation is
therefore a backwards tracing from the accident,
trying to find the effective cause(s). The method
requires that the system is tractable, since it
otherwise would be impossible to carry out this
backwards tracing. The method also requires that
the system is only loosely coupled, since it
otherwise would be impossible to feel confident
that the correction or elimination of the root cause
would prevent a recurrence of the accident. 
• The functional resonance accident model (FRAM)
assumes that adverse outcomes are the result of
unexpected combinations of normal variability of
system functions. In other words, it is the tight
couplings that lead to adverse outcomes and not
sequences of cause(s) and effect(s). Since the
investigation furthermore looks for functions 
rather than structures, it is less problematic if the
description is intractable. Indeed, functions may
come and go over time whereas system structures
must be more permanent. Functions are associated
with the social organisation of work and the
demands of a specific situation. Structures are
associated with the physical system and equipment,
which does not change from situation to situation. 
This characterisation does not mean that FRAM is 
a better method than RCA in an absolute sense. 
(A similar argument can be made for any other
comparison of two methods.) But it does mean that
FRAM is well-suited for some kinds of problems and
that RCA is well-suited for others, more precisely that
FRAM is better suited for risks in tightly coupled,
intractable systems. (It of course also means that there
are problems for which either method is ill-suited.) 
The risks that dominate in present day systems have a
different aetiology than the risks that dominated one or
two decades ago. This has two important ramifications.
The first is that it is more difficult to understand these
risks. It is harder to understand that risks may exist, at
least until an accident has happened. It is harder to
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understand the “mechanisms”, because risks can 
arise from non-linear interactions among normal
performance variability as well as from consequences
of failures and malfunctions. And because of that it 
is also more difficult to think of ways to reduce or
eliminate the risks. In tractable systems, risks are often
associated with specific components or subsystems, or
with specific actions or operations. Risk reduction can
therefore be achieved by either eliminating the risk, 
by preventing certain actions, or by protecting against
the outcomes. But only the last option is available for
intractable systems. Eliminating or preventing
performance variability may well reduce the risk, 
but it will also impede normal functioning. 
The second ramification is that many of the established
risk assessment and accident investigation methods are
inadequate for tightly coupled, intractable systems.
This dilemma was made clear when Perrow proposed
that accidents could be seen as normal, because risk
assessment and accident investigation methods
naturally focus on that which is abnormal or
dysfunctional. The lesson to be learnt from that is that
we must continue to evaluate critically the methods
that are at our disposal. The fact that a method has
worked in the past is no guarantee that it will also
work in the future. The development of new socio-
technical systems  means that new risks will emerge,
and therefore that existing methods sooner or later 
will need to be complemented with more powerful
approaches. What these will be, no one can say 
for certain. 
References
Adamski, A. & Westrum, R. (2003). Requisite
imagination. The fine art of anticipating what might 
go wrong. In E. Hollnagel (Ed.), Handbook of cognitive
task design (pp. 193-220). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates. 
Arrhenius, S. (1896). On the influence of carbonic 
acid in the air upon the temperature of the ground.
Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, 
Series 5, Volume 41, pp.  237-276.
Bento, J.-P. (1992). Människa, teknik och organisation.
Kurs i MTO-analys för Socialstyrelsen. Studsvik,
Nyköping: Kärnkraftsäkerhet och Utbildnings AB.
CISHC (Chemical Industry and Safety Council), (1977).
A guide to hazard and operability studies. London:
Chemical Industries Association.
Cooper, S. E., Ramey-Smith, A. M., Wreathall, J., Parry,
G. W., Bley, D. C. & Luckas, W. J. (1996). A Technique
for Human Error Analysis (ATHEANA). Washington,
DC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dekker, S. (2006). The field guide to understanding
human error. Aldershot, UK: Ashagte.
Fujita, Y. & Hollnagel, E. (2004). Failures without
errors: Quantification of context in HRA. Reliability
Engineering and System Safety, 83, 145-151.
Heinrich, H. W. (1931). Industrial accident prevention:
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Helmreich, R. L., Merritt, A. C. & Wilhelm, J. A. (1999).
The evolution of Crew Resource Management training
in commercial aviation. International Journal of
Aviation Psychology, 9(1), 19-32.
Hollnagel, E. (1998). Cognitive reliability and error
analysis method. Oxford, UK: Elsevier Science Ltd.
Hollnagel, E. (2004). Barriers and accident prevention.
Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D. D. & Leveson, N. G. (2006).
Resilience engineering: Concepts and precepts.
Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Hudson, P., Primrose, M. J. & Edwards, C. (1994).
Implementing tripod-DELTA in a major contractor. In:
Proceedings of the the SPE International Conference 
on Health, Safety and Environment, Jakarta, Indonesia.
Richardson, TX: Society of Petroleum Engineers.
INPO (1989). Human performance enhancement system:
Coordinator manual (INPO 86-016, Rev. 02). Atlanta,
GA: Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Isaac, A., Shorrock, S. & Kirwan, B. (2002) Human error
in European air traffic management: The HERA project.
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 75(2), 
257-272.
Le Bot, P., Cara, F. & Bieder, C. (1999). MERMOS, A
second generation HRA method. Proceedings of PSA
‘99, International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic
Safety Assessment", Washington, DC.
Leveson, N. G. (1995). Safeware - system safety and
computers. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Leveson, N. G. (2004). A New Accident Model for
Engineering Safer Systems. Science, 42(4), 237-270.
HFESA Journal ,  Ergonomics Austral ia Vol  22,  Number 1,  March-June 08
46
ERGONOMICS AUSTRALIA
MIL-STD-1629A (1980). Procedures for performing 
a failure mode, effects and criticality analysis.
Washington, DC: Department of Defence.
Nouvel, D.; Travadel, S. & Hollnagel, E. (2007).
Introduction of the concept of functional resonance in
the analysis of a near-accident in aviation. Ispra, Italy,
November 2007, 33rd ESReDA Seminar: Future
challenges of accident investigation.
Perrow, C. (1984). Normal accidents: Living with high
risk technologies. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
Pringle, J. W. S. (1951). On the parallel between
learning and evolution. Behaviour, 3, 175-215. 
Reason, J. T. (1990). Human Error. Cambridge
University Press
Reason, J. T. (1997). Managing the risk of
organisational accidents. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
Rollenhagen, C. (1995). MTO – En Introduktion:
Sambandet Människa, Teknik och Organisation.
Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratur.
Sawaragi, T.; Horiguchi, Y. & Hina, A. (2006). Safety
analysis of systemic accidents triggered by performance
deviation. Bexco, Busan, South Korea, October 18-21.
SICE-ICASE International Joint Conference 2006.
Svensson, O. (2001). Accident and Incident Analysis
Based on the Accident Evolution and Barrier Function 
(AEB) Model. Cognition, Technology & Work, 3(1), 
42-52.
Takano, K., Sawayanagi, K. & Kabetani, T. (1994).
System for analysing and evaluating human-related
nuclear power plant incidents. Journal of Nuclear
Science Technology, 31, 894-913.
Wears, R. L., Perry, S. J., Anders, S. & Woods, D. D.
(2008). Resilience in the emergency department. In
Hollnagel, E., Nemeth, C. & Dekker, S. (Eds)., Remaining
sensitive to the possibility of failure. Aldershot, UK:
Ashgate.
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M. & Obstfeld, D. (1999).
Organising for high reliability: processes of collective
mindfulness. Research in Organisational Behaviour,
21, 81–123.
Westrum, R. (2006). A typology of resilience situations.
In E. Hollnagel, D. D. Woods & N. G. Leveson (Eds.),
Resilience engineering: Concepts and precepts.
Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Wilson, P. et. al., (1993). Root cause analysis – A tool
for total quality management. Milwaukee, WI: Quality
Press.
Yoshizawa,Y. (1999). Activities for on-site application
performed in human factors group. Proceedings of 3rd
International Conference on Human Factors in Nuclear
Power Operation (ICNPO-III), Mihama, Japan.
HFESA Journal ,  Ergonomics Austral ia Vol  22,  Number 1,  March-June 08
47
ERGONOMICS AUSTRALIA
1. Call for 2008 HFESA Awards
Nominations are being sought for 2008 Awards and
further details may be found on the HFESA website
www.ergonomics.org.au. Persons interested in
nominating a candidate for any of the awards 
should contact the HFESA Secretariat.
The Human Factors and Ergonomics Society of
Australia presents nine national Awards that reflect
outstanding achievement by individuals or groups 
for service to the Society and the human factors and
ergonomics profession as well as to the research and
application of human factors and ergonomics in
Australia. Five of the Awards are named after Founders
of the Society who have been Presidents and Fellows
of the Society. 
The Executive of CHISIG, the Computer-Human
Interaction Special Interest Group of the Society,
nominate a recipient for the CHISIG Medal. CHISIG
also has an Award for the best paper at their annual
OZCHI conference that is named in honour of Gitte
Lindgaard. 
The HFESA Board and the Annual Conference
Committee nominate the Society Medal and the Ron
Cumming Memorial Lecturer, respectively. Members of
the HFESA are invited to nominate eligible people for
the remaining Awards. The David Ferguson Award
requires the support and endorsement of the student’s
supervisor. 
The Honours and Awards Committee of the HFESA
processes and endorses the Awards. All are based on
merit and may not be bestowed every year. 
Fellowship
• For outstanding contribution to the Society and 
the human factors and ergonomics profession 
over a period of at least ten years. 
• Awarded to a member of the Society in good
standing. 
• The Award is based on the assessment of the
Honours and Awards Committee and ratified 
by the Society Board. 
• The Award is in the form of a membership
certificate showing Fellow and confers honorary
status. 
The Society Medal
• For outstanding service to and promotion of the
Society over at least seven years. 
• Awarded to a member of the Society in good
standing. 
• The Award is based the collaborative assessment 
of the Society President and the Honours and
Awards Committee. 
• The Award is in the form of a medal suitably
inscribed with the recipient’s name. 
Cumming Memorial Medal and Lecture
• For highly esteemed human factors and
ergonomics-related research or application in a
relevant area of human factors and ergonomics. 
• Awarded to an Australian resident, preferably 
a member of the Society. 
• The Award is based on the assessment of the
Honours and Awards Committee. 
• The Award is in the form of a Medal suitably
inscribed with the recipient’s name together with
the presentation of the Cumming Memorial Lecture
at the Society’s Annual Conference for the year 
of the Award. 
Ken Provins Award
• For the best paper presented during the Society’s
Annual Conference for the year of the Award. 
• Awarded to individual or joint authorship, but 
not for a keynote speaker. 
• The Award is based on both the written paper 
and the oral presentation at the conference. 
• The Award is in the form of a Certificate for 
each author. 
Alan Welford Award
• For the best paper on a human factors and
ergonomics topic published in a peer reviewed
journal within the calendar year prior to the Award. 
• Awarded to individual or joint authorship, one of
whom is a member of the Society.
Noticeboard
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• The Award is based on the intrinsic merit of 
the paper itself and its readability for the 
target audience. 
• The Award is in the form of a Certificate for 
each author. 
John Lane Award
• For a major systematic contribution to advancing
the science of human factors and ergonomics and
its application in Australia. This contribution may
have been made at any time.  
• Awarded to an individual, group or organisation
having a relevant human factors and ergonomics
connection with Australia. 
• Covers work carried out over several years during
the last five to ten years. 
• The Award is in the form of a Certificate. 
David Ferguson Award
• For the best postgraduate project report or
undergraduate honours thesis produced in the 
18 months prior to the Award. 
• Awarded to an individual student enrolled in a
relevant Australian University program of study. 
• The Award is based on a paper summarising the
report or thesis together with a supporting
statement from the student’s supervisor. 
• The Award is in the form of a Certificate plus one
year's appropriate membership of the Society. The
paper will be published in Ergonomics Australia.
The CHISIG Medal
• For outstanding service to and promotion of the
CHISIG over at least seven years. 
• Awarded to a member of the CHISIG in good
standing, or a retired member of CHISIG. 
• Nominations can be submitted by any CHISIG
member. 
• The Award is based the collaborative assessment 
of the CHISIG Executive. 
• The Award is in the form of a medal suitably
inscribed with the recipient's name. 
Gitte Lindgaard Award
• For the best paper presented during OZCHI,
CHISIG’s annual Conference for the year of the
Award. 
• Awarded to individual or joint authorship, but 
not for a keynote speaker. 
• The Award is based on both the written paper 
and the oral presentation at the conference 
• The Award is in the form of a Certificate for 
each author. 
2. Postgraduate Ergonomics at Queensland University
There have been some changes. 2007 was a transitional
year in which the frequency of offering each course
was reduced. From 2008 the GCErg, GDipErg and MErg
programs will be available in part-time remote mode
only. While we intend to integrate opportunities for
face to face contact each year via a "winter school",
attendance at these blocks will be optional. An
information sheet can be obtained from
www.ergonomics.uq.edu.au/pgradergo8.pdf or contact:
A/P Robin Burgess-Limerick 
Postgraduate Ergonomics Coordinator,
School of Human Movement Studies 
The University of Queensland 4072 Australia
robin@hms.uq.edu.au  
T: +61 7 3365 4718
M: 0401 714 511
3. HFES Digital Library
The Human Factors and Ergonomics Society has
opened Phase I of the HFES Digital Library. The 
online collection of HFES periodicals is available for
purchase/subscription to non-members. Members of the
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society of Australia
are entitled to a special discount from the regular non-
member rates. To view the FAQ, go to
http://www.hfes.org/web/PubPages/DigitalLibraryFAQ.ht
ml.
The Digital Library now contains Human Factors,
Ergonomics in Design, and HFES Annual Meeting
Proceedings since 1993. By the end of 2008, content
going back to 1980 will be available. When the third
phase is complete (end of 2009), all the back volumes
will be available, in addition to Reviews of Human
Factors and Ergonomics. For those who hold a current
subscription to the new journal from HFES, Journal of
Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making, that
content will also be accessible.
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Two packages are available: Digital Library-Archive
contains older volumes for a one-time purchase of
US$638, and Digital Library-Current contains the three
most recent years of all five titles for an annual
subscription rate of US$611. Save another US$100
when you purchase both Archive and Current.
Please contact HFES at store@hfes.org, 310/394-1811,
fax 310/394-2410 if you would like to purchase the
Digital Library at the special HFESA rates. Do not order
online.
4. CYBERG 2008
Fifth International Cyberspace Conference on
Ergonomics (CybErg'08) 
Local Knowledge, Global Applications
15 September—15 October 2008. 
CybErg'08 is the fifth conference in the series, and is
intended to cover issues on all aspects of ergonomics,
highlighting the latest developments and current
technologies in those areas. The theme of this
upcoming CybErg'08 is "Local knowledge, Global
Applications" which aims to deliberate and discuss
ergonomic issues such as those applied in developing
economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
However, one of the deterrents to greater participation
from countries with developing economies has been 
the high international travel costs. As CybErg'08 is 
an online conference, it is easy to see how an
international conference based on the World Wide Web
can drastically reduce travel-related costs. In addition,
with greater participation from the under-represented
communities, it is anticipated that issues normally not
discussed at major conferences would be covered.  In
addition, participation and responses received from the
industries and organizations associated with previous
CybErg Conferences have been very encouraging.
Last but not least, given the conference is on-going for
a month, there is ample opportunity to discuss issues
which may not normally get air-time given the limited
amount of period available to conduct a lengthy
discussion.  With "bulletin boards" available,
participants will have an opportunity to discuss with
the authors and other attendees with similar interests.
Please note that awards for best paper and most active
discussion groups, will be also be presented at this
conference.
For more information, please visit
http://www.cyberg2008.org. Should you have any
queries, please contact Ms. D'oria Islamiah (CybErg'08
Secretary) (mailto:secretariat@cyberg2008.org) or me
(mailto:alvin@fit.unimas.my ).
Dr Alvin W. Yeo
Chairman
Fifth International Cyberspace Conference On
Ergonomics 2008 (CybErg '08)
A/P Alvin W. Yeo 
Deputy Dean (Postgraduate and Research)
Faculty of Computer Science and 
Information Technology
Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS)
94300 Kota Samarahan 
Sarawak MALAYSIA
Email: alvin AT fit.unimas.my, awy AT acm.org
Tel: + 6082-583 765/583784
Fax: + 6082-583 764
5. HEPS International Congress 
(Healthcare Ergonomics and Patient Safety) 
Strasbourg on June 25-27, 2008.
The HEPS 2008 conference will focus on the strategic
role of citizens, patients and clinicians in the design
and improvement of healthcare systems.
HEPS2008 is an International Ergonomics Association
(IEA) sponsored event, organized with the support of
the Italian and French Health Ministry, and Tuscany
region, and endorsed by the European Parliament, the
European Council, and the Haute Autorité de Santé.
The new important aspect of this second conference
edition is the participation of more than 10 Patient
Safety Champions representatives of the World Alliance
for Patient Safety. Every session of the conference will
commence with a testimony their experiences.
The main challenge and factor of success of the event
is to create a bridge between the world of healthcare
practioners and the world of specialists in human
factor and ergonomics.
More than 300 abstracts from all over the world have
been turned in, and many clinicians, experts and
academics from 28 different countries have already
decided to attend.
Registrations to the event are still open! This congress
is a great occasion to get in touch with people who are
trying to conjugate human factor ergonomics and
patient safety in the world of healthcare.
For further information please visit the HEPS 2008
website, www.heps2008.org or contact the Organizing
Secretariat (heps2008@newtours.it - 
Tel. +39 055 3361.1 - Fax +39 055 3033895).
We look forward to seeing you in Strasbourg! 
The Organizing Board 
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6. 13th Annual Conference of the Biofeedback
Foundation of Europe 
co-sponsored by the Technische Universiteit,
Eindhoven, University of Technology.
Date: February 24-28, 2009 
Location: Technische Universiteit, Eindhoven,
University of Technology, The Netherlands. 
Submission deadlines:
July 1, 2008: Workshop proposals
October 10, 2008: Symposia, Papers, Posters, 
and Short Courses
Download Submission Forms: www.bfe.org
Erik Peper, Ph.D.
President, BFE Advisory Scientific Board
Biofeedback Foundation of Europe
P.O. Box 555   3800 AN Amersfoort, The Netherlands
Danielle Matto/Senior Administrator: d.matto@bfe.org 
Fax: +31 84 83 84 696 
Monika Fuhs/Executive Director: editor@bfe.org
Phone: +43 699 124 20 941
www.bfe.org
Erik Peper, Ph.D.
Professor 
Institute for Holistic Health Studies
Department of Health Education
San Francisco State University
1600 Holloway Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94132
Tel: 415.338.7683  Cell: 510.681 6301
Fax: 415.338.0570 
Email: epeper@sfsu.edu   www.sfsu.edu/~ihhs
7. IEA'2009 Triennial Congress
Information about the conference, including deadlines
and the template for abstracts is available on IEA
website. The deadline for submitting abstracts is
November 15, 2008.
For more information, please go to the website 
of the IEA'2009 congress: www.iea2009.org
Pascale Carayon, 
Secretary General of the IEA
www.iea.cc 
8. 3rd International Conference on Rail Human Factors
We are pleased to inform you of the 3rd International
Conference on Rail Human Factors.  It will be held in
Lille, France on 3-5 March 2009.  All details about 
the conference are posted on the website:
www.railhumanfactors.co.uk
The conference is organised by the European Railway
Agency, Rail Safety and Standards Board, Network Rail
and University of Nottingham.  This will be in
association with the Ergonomics Society, Société
d'Ergonomie de Langue Française (SELF) and Rail
Research UK.
As with the first two conferences in the series it will 
be THE forum for human factors practitioners and
researchers to discuss their latest work, and for the 
rail industry and regulators to describe their current
use of ergonomics and human factors and to identify
their future needs.
A number of leading authorities will be keynote and
invited speakers. There will be workshop and open
discussion sessions as well as technical paper
presentations, and there will also be a number of
technical visits available.
Please register your interest in the conference as 
early as possible, with stella.Okezie@rssb.co.uk. For
information about submission of abstracts, please
contact ECRHF@nottingham.ac.uk
We look forward to seeing you in Lille in March 2009.
Jane Rajan, Ann Mills, Theresa Clarke, John Wilson
www.railhumanfactors.co.uk
Professor John R Wilson
Human Factors Group
School of M3
University of Nottingham
Nottingham NG7 2RD
email: john.wilson@nottingham.ac.uk
tel: +44 (0)115 9514004
mobile: +44 (0)7780 610973
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9. HFESA 44th Annual Conference 
Sustainable Performance: Human Factors, 
Ergonomics and the Work Environment. 
17–19 November 2008
A human-centred approach considers people first in 
the design of the work environment. It improves the
performance of both individuals and the organisation.
Sustainable work performance means sound business
development and profitability. The current business
context is full of stressors, demands, and pressures. 
The economy is booming and businesses are positively
financially geared. But there are barriers to sustainable
performance: threat of a slowing economy in the US, 
a skilled-labour shortage, community demands for
family-work-life balance, a shortage of infrastructure
and the ever-present government red tape! In this
conference we will explore the relationship between
sustainable performance and the health and safety of
workers, as well the impact on the wider community.
Come and join us in analysing sustainability at work 
in a changing workplace and changing work
environment. Make your contribution. Challenge 
your thinking – and challenge others. 
University of South Australia - City East Campus.
Adelaide, South Australia 
www.hfesaconference.org.au 
Jennie Window 
Assistant Secretary, 
HFESA SA Branch 
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2008
25–27 June
2008—HEPS International Conference
Health Ergonomics and patient Safety
Strasburg
For further information please visit the HEPS 2008
website, www.heps2008.org or contact the Organizing
Secretariat 
(heps2008@newtours.it - Tel. +39 055 3361.1 - 
Fax +39 055 3033895).
14–17 July
2008—2nd International Conference 
on Applied Ergonomics (AE International 2008)
Jointly with 12th International Conference on Human
Aspects of Advanced Manufacturing (HAAMAHA)
Caesars Palace • Las Vegas, Nevada USA
Under the auspices of 7 distinguished international
boards of 167 members from 29 countries
Conference Chair: Gavriel Salvendy
salvendy@purdue.edu
Program Chair: Waldemar Karwowski
karwowski@louisville.edu
Conference Administrator: Laura Abell
laurajere@peoplepc.com
Fax: + 1 502 852 7397
Communication & Exhibition Chair : Abbas Moallem
Abbas.Moallem@sjsu.edu
URL: www.AEI2008.org
15 September—15 October
Fifth International Cyberspace Conference on
Ergonomics (CybErg'08) 
Local Knowledge, Global Applications
Contact:
CybErg 2008: http://www.cyberg2008.org. 
Ms. D'oria Islamiah (CybErg'08 Secretary) 
E: secretariat@cyberg2008.org) or 
A/P Alvin Yeo (Conference Chairman) E:
alvin@fit.unimas.my ).
17th - 19th November
44th Annual HFESA Conference
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society of Australia. 
Sustainable Performance: Human Factors, Ergonomics
and the Work Environment. 
University of South Australia - City East Campus.
Adelaide, South Australia
www.hfesaconference.org.au
2009
24–28 February 2009
13th Annual Conference 
Biofeedback Foundation of Europe
co-sponsored by the Technische Universiteit,
Eindhoven, University of Technology.
Technische Universiteit, Eindhoven, University of
Technology, The Netherlands.  
Erik Peper, Ph.D.
President, BFE Advisory Scientific Board
Biofeedback Foundation of Europe
P.O. Box 555   3800 AN Amersfoort, The Netherlands
Danielle Matto / Senior Administrator:
d.matto@bfe.org 
Fax: +31 84 83 84 696 
Monika Fuhs / Executive Director: editor@bfe.org
Phone: +43 699 124 20 941
www.bfe.org
3–5 March 2009
3rd International Conference on Rail Human Factors
Lille, France 
All details about the conference are posted on the
website:  www.railhumanfactors.co.uk
Please register your interest in the conference as early
as possible, with  stella.Okezie@rssb.co.uk. 
For information about submission of abstracts, 
please contact ECRHF@nottingham.ac.uk
Jane Rajan, Ann Mills, Theresa Clarke, John Wilson
www.railhumanfactors.co.uk
9–14 August 2009
17th World Congress on Ergonomics
IEA 2009 Beijing, China
Congress Secretariat:
Tel: +86 10 8280 1728
Fax: +86 10 8280 5315
E-mail: iea09secretariat@bjmu.edu.au.cn
Post: Chinese Ergonomics Society
Health Science Center
Beijing 100083 China
Conference Calendar
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Articles published in Ergonomics Australia are subject
to peer review.
Editor
Dr Shirleyann M Gibbs
25 Melaleuca Drive St Ives NSW 2075 Australia
Tel: +612 9983 9855  Fax:  +612 9402 5295
E-mail: shanng@optusnet.com.au
The intended deadline for issues in 2008:
March edition February 1
June edition May 1
September edition August 1
December edition November 1
Contributions
Any inquiries about contributions should be directed 
in the first instance to the Editor.
Inquiries
All advertising inquiries should be directed to the
National Secretariat of the Society.
Contact
The Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 
of Australia Inc
PO Box 7848 Balkham Hills BC NSW 2153
Tel: +612 9680 9026   Fax: +612 9680 9027
Email: secretariat@ ergonomics.org.au
Size
The finished page size of the Newsletter is 
A4 (210mm x 297mm)
Printed column sizes are 165mm x 225mm (double) 
or 80mm x 225mm (single)
Advertising Copy
Must be camera ready and must arrive at the HFESA
Federal Office by the Copy Deadline Submission Date
for the Edition in question.
A professional advertising service is available for
producing camera ready copy if required. For further
inquiries regarding this service contact:
Mr Goro Jankulovski, Acute Concepts Pty Ltd
Tel: 03 9381 9696     Mobile: 0414 605 414 
E-mail: goro@acuteconcepts.com.au
Rates for advertising (per issue), 
inclusive of GST are:
Full page 1/2 page 1/4 page 1/8 page
Single issue $ 330.00 165.00 82.50 41.80
2 issues $ 297.00 148.50 74.80 37.40
3 issues $ 264.00 132.00 66.00 33.00
4 or more $ 231.00 115.50 58.30 29.70
Please forward advertising bookings to
secretariat@ergonomics.org.au. Enclosures are also
welcome (number required to be confirmed).  The
current rates are:
Enclosure not requiring folding $412.50
Enclosure requiring folding $462.00
However, heavy enclosures would incur a higher 
fee depending on weight.
Information 
for Contributors
Information
for Advertisers
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Enclosures
Pre-printed enclosures (leaflets, brochures) etc are
welcome for inclusion with the Journal.
Enclosures should be pre-folded to fit inside the
finished Journal.
Rates for enclosures
Enclosure not requiring folding $ 412.50
Enclosure requiring folding $ 462
These rates may increase if the enclosure weighs more
than the equivalent of 2 standard weight A4 pages.
These rates are inclusive of GST
640 copies should be sent to arrive at the ESA Federal
Office by the Copy Deadline Submission Date for the
Edition in question.
Address for mailing Advertising copy 
and/or enclosures
National Secretariat 
The Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 
of Australia Inc.
PO Box 7848 Balkham Hills BC NSW 2153
Advertising copy and enclosure submission deadlines
for 2008 are the same as for Contributions — 1st of
month prior to publication
Edition Submission Deadline 
March February 1
June May 1
September August 1
December November 1  
Circulation
The Journal is published four times a year and is
received by approximately 620 professionals Australia
wide working in the areas of ergonomics, occupational
health and safety, and design.
Ergonomics Australia On-Line (EAOL)
Advertising and sponsorship opportunities also exist in
the electronic version of this journal (EAOL) which is
managed by Dr Robin Burgess-Limerick at Department
of Human Movement at Queensland University.  It is
downloaded by more than 100 Australian and
International readers each week.  
To view EAOL: http://www.uq.edu.au or enter via 
the HFESA website.
Caveats
The views expressed in the Journal are those of the
individual authors and contributors and are not
necessarily those of the Society.
The HFESA Inc reserves the right to refuse any
advertising inconsistent with the Aims and Objectives
of the Society and Journal Editorial Policy.       
The appearance of an advertisement in the Journal
does not imply endorsement by the Society of the
product and or service advertised.
The Society takes no responsibility for products or
services advertised therein.
Editor
Shirleyann M Gibbs PhD
E-mail: shanng@optusnet.com.au
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